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RICHMOND
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Appeal from Va.
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(order)
State/Civil

v.
VIRGINIA
1.

SUMMARY:

The question is whether the exclusion

of newspaper reporters, along with all other members of the
public, from a two-day murder trial in state court, pursuant
to a Virginia statute, is consistent with the First, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, in light of this Court's recent
decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
'

I

•,_,/

1979).

u.s.

(July 2,
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FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

On September 11, 1978,

at the start of a murder trial in a state circuit court in
Hanover, Virginia, the defendant's attorney moved "that
everybody be excluded from the Courtroom because I don't want
any information being shuffled back and forth when we have a
recess as to what --who testified to what."

After confirming

that the defense wished to exclude the press, as well as the
rest of the public, the prosecutor stated that he had no objection to the motion.

The trial judge, noting that "the

1/

statute gives me that power specifically,"-

ruled "that the

Courtroom be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when
they testify."

After the courtroom was cleared of all members

of the public, including appellants Wheeler and McCarthy, who
are reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, the trial commenced in secret.
At the close of the first day of trial, the trial judge
held a hearing on a motion by appellants to vacate the closure
order and to reopen the trial.

Because the closure order re-

~---- ~------------------~

mained in effect, appellants were excluded from this hearing,
while their counsel argued the motion on their behalf.
Appellants' counsel argued that because no findings
were made as to the danger of prejudicial publicity or the

}:_I
(

(
I
L

Virginia Code § 19.2-266 provides in pertinent part: "In
the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or
misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude
from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the
conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused
to a public trial shall not be violated."
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availability of alternative measures to ensure a fair trial,
the closure order violated the Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial and appellants' First Amendment rights to receive and to
report information.

Defense counsel argued that exclusion of the

press was proper to prevent the jurors from being exposed to
prejudicial publicity.

The defense attorney noted that the trial

was being held in a small community and that" the defendant was on

2/

trial for murder for the fourth time. -

The trial judge noted that this was the defendant's
vfourth trial and that because of the "layout of the Courtroom
having people in the Courtroom is distracting to the jury."

After

expressing general agreement with defense counsel's argument, the

( .

trial judge denied the motion to vacate the closure order.
The trial continued in secret on the following day.

For

reasons unknown, the trial judge granted a defense motion to strike
the prosecution's evidence and entered a directed verdict of acquittal on September 12, 1978.
Appellants appealed the closure order to the Virginia
Supreme Court.

Appellants also petitioned the Virginia Supreme

Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the trial

2/

,.'--(
\

.:

At his first trial, the defendant was convicted of second
degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal because
a bloodstained shirt had been improperly admitted into evidence.
The defendant's second trial ended in a mistrial because a juror
asked to be excused due to a nervous condition. The defendant's
third trial ended in a mistrial, a~parently because a prospective
juror had read about the defendant s previous trials and had related information about them to other prospective jurors.
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judge from denying them access to the murder trial and future
criminal proceedings.

On July 9, 1979, the Virginia Supreme

Court refused the petition for appeal and dismissed appellants'
petitions for mandamus and prohibition.

In brief orders, each

concluding with a citation of this Court's decision in Gannett
Co. v. DePasguale, 47 U.S.L.W. 4902 (July 2, 1979), the court
stated only that there was "no reversible e r ror in the judgment"
and that the writs "should not issue."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants argue that this case

presents the Court with an opportunity to determine whether
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale permits the exclusion of the public
and press from entire criminal trials.

Appellants contend that

the Virginia courts, by rejecting appellants' constitutional
challenge to the closure order, ha.ve upheld the validity of
Virginia Code § 19.2-266 (see n.l ) against the claim that it
violates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
constitution.

Appellants maintain that the statute is unconstitu-

tional on its face and as applied.
Insofar as it permits the total excl\lsion of the public
and the press from an entire criminal trial, the Virginia closure
statute violates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Appellants maintain that,

regardles~

of its specific constitutional

source, public access to criminal trials is a fundamental constitutional right.

Appellants note that in Gannett four members of this

Court grounded the right of public access to criminal trials in the
Sixth Amendment's Public Trial Clause.

Although the majority in
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Gannett took the contrary view, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, whose
concurrence was decisive, insisted that the

Court'~ision

only dealt with the closure of pretrial hearings.

MR. JUSTICE

POWELL expressed the view that the First Amendment provides
reporters with a right of access to criminal proceedings.

Ap-

pellants argue that the right of public access to criminal trials,
like other fundamental constitutional rights, can be derived from
its long and unbroken observance as well as its central role in
preserving other rights.

Because the Virginia statute authorizes

the wholesale abrogation of the right of public access to trials
at the trial court's uncontrolled discretion, the statute is unconstitutional on its face.

(

While closures of pretrial hearings

may be justified in certain circumstances to prevent prospective
jurors from being exposed to prejudicial information, it is not
possible to justify closure of an entire trial because after the
trial has commenced a variety of other means exist to prevent jurors
from exposure to such information.
Appellants also argue that the Virginia closure statute is
unconstitutional as applied because it permits secret trials without
any showing that they are necessary to accommodete significant
countervailing interests.

No showing was ever made that an open

trial would threaten any significant interest.

Defense counsel

simply alluded to potential problems of prejudicial publicity without explaining why they necessitated closure of the trial.

(_)

No

showing was ever made that less drastic measures, such as sequestration of the jury or exclusion of witnesses while not testifying,
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were unavailable to protect the interests of the accused.

The

trial court made no attempt to accommodate the rights of the
public and the press and there was no showing that exclusion of
these groups would prove effective in preventing prejudicial
publicity.
Appe llees maintain that the appeal should be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction because appellants failed to challenge
the validity of the Virginia statute in the courts below.

Because

appellants never mentioned the Virginia statute when challenging
the closure order, the state courts were never given an opportunity
to construe the statute in a manner that might have saved it from
constitutional infirmity.

While a state court's judgment upholding

action taken under a statute may have the effect of upholding the
statute, for this Court to have appellate jurisdiction it is
necessary that the statute be challenged explicitly in the state
court.
Appellants argue that an appeal is properly taken because
the trial judge relied on the Virginia statute as his sole source
of authority for excluding the public from the trial.

Appellants

note that the trial judge referred to the statute when entering the
closure order.
On .the merits, appellees argue tha t a ppellants fail to
raise a substantial federal question in L ) ·1t of Gannett's holding
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial is a right
personal to the accused.

The Virginia statute does not provide

state courts with unbridled discretion to close criminal trials

- 7 -
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because it only authorizes the exclusion of "persons whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial."

While

there is a strong societal interest in public trials, appellees maintain that the state court properly balanced the
"rights" of the public against the rights of the accused,
particularly in light of problems with prejudicial publicity
at the defendant's previous trials.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Although this case presents

substantial federal questions that merit consideration by
this

I

Cou~t, v;;;;ellants

failed to challenge the validity of

Virginia Code § 19.2-266 in the courts below.

Although the

trial judge noted that "the statute gives me that power [to

close trials] specifically," it is unclear whether the closure
order was premised on the statute or the inherent powers of the
court to supervise the conduct of trials.

Appellants never

mentioned the Virginia statute when they challenged the closure
order and the state courts never interpreted the statute.
IL

Thus

l'>

this appeal probably is improvidently taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§

1257(2).

---..

Treating the papers as a petition for certiorari,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2103, it appears that this case presents
substantial federal questions that may merit review by this Court.
Although this Court upheld the exclusion of the public and the
press from a pretrial suppression hearing in Gannett, that decision may not sanction the wholesale exclusion of the public and
the press from entire criminal trials, particularly on the facts
of this case .

.'
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The majority opinion in Gannett recognized that at
pretrial suppression hearings the dangers of prejudicial
publicity are greater, and the availability of prophylactic
alternatives to closure is less, than at trial.

The Gannett

majority also recognized that closed pretrial proceedings
were more common historically than secret trials.

THE CHIEF

JUSTICE, in his concurrence, emphasized that Ga nnett involved
a pretrial proceeding, rather than a trial.

Although these

distinctions could conceivably justify a different Sixth
Amendment standard for the closure of trials, MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST's concurrence expressed the view that the majority's
holding that the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a public

c--

trial only upon the defendant permits the closure of both pretrial hearings and trials whenever the parties consent to it.
This case could present the Court with an opportunity to clarify
whether there is any distinction for Sixth Amendment purposes
between the closure of pretrial proceedings and the closure of
an entire criminal trial.
This case could also provide the Court with an
opportunity to consider the First Amendment issues that were
reserved in Gannett.

The majority opinion in Gannett declined

to reach the question whether reporters have a First and

.,.,

Fourteenth Amendment right to attend criminal trials on the
ground that the trial court had struck a proper balance betv.'een
any First Amendment interests and the right of the defendants to
a fair trial.

The majority noted that the trial judge in Ga nnett

- 9 had found a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to the
defendants and that "[o]nce the danger of prejudice had
dissipated, a transcript of the suppression hearing was made
available."

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, in his concurrence, expressed

the view that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did provide
reporters with a right of access to criminal proceedings, but
that the trial court had adequately respected that right.
If there is a First and Fourteenth Amendment right of
public access to criminal trials, it is doubtful that the trial
court in this case gave it appropriate deference.

Although the

trial judge and the defense attorney mentioned the possibility
of prejudicial publicity, no explanation was ever offered as to

(

the nature of this danger or the reasons why it justified closure
of the entire trial.

Although the defendant was on trial for the

fourth time, closure of the trial did nothing to prevent public
access to prejudicial information about the previous trials.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the interest in preventing the
jury from having access to inadmissible information could justify
exclusion of the public and the press from the proceedings that
occurred in the presence of the jury.

It is also doubtful that

the trial judge's corrment that the presence of the public might
distract the jury could justify the . extraordinary remedy of
conducting the trial in secret.
Although the trial has now been completed, the case is

(j

not moot because, as in Gannett, the underlying issue is "capable

~

of repetition, yet evading review."

The amicus brief of the
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Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press indicates that
efforts to deny public access to criminal proceedings are being
made with increasing frequency.

In the seven weeks following

Gannett, 51 attempts have been made to deny public access to
~

criminal proceedings, and more than half of them have been
successful.

Although most of the closure motions have involved

pretrial proceedings, some trials have also been closed.
I recommend that the appeal be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, but that, treating the jurisdictional statement as
a petition for cert, that cert be granted.
There is a motion to dismiss and a reply and three amicus
briefs in support of the jurisdictional statement.

(
9/25/79
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February 21, 1 8oOf'ICE Of ~ JJ· .~~
SU~-·....~oJo&Miolt__t

The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
RE:

Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al.
v. Virginia, ~tal., No. 79-243

Dear Mr. Rodak:
As Counsel for Appellants, I should appreciate your
informing the Members of the Court of the following development
in the above-captioned case.
In his oral argument, the
Attorney General of Virginia made reference to a statute
that his office had introduced to control trial closures in
Virginia by amending Virginia Code §19.2-266.
I have learned
that the Attorney General's Bill, H.B. 700, was referred to
the Committee for Courts of Justice of the Virginia House of
Delegates on February 1, 1980, but that this Bill was carried
over to the 1981 Session on February 15, 1980, four days
before the oral argument in the above-captioned case.
February
18, 1980 was the last day on which new Bills for the 1980
Session could be put before the full House of Delegates. No
Bill on this subject is therefore pending in the current
Session of the Virginia Legislature.
Yours truly(

Laurence H. Tribe
Counsel for Appellants
LHT/is

FEB 2 9 1980
OffiCE OF THE ClERK

SUPREM£ COU~T. U.S.

February 27, 1980

The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk, United States Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al.
v.
Virginia, et al., No. 79-243

Dear Mr. Rodak:
I am in receipt of a copy of the letter addressed to you
in this matter from Laurence H. Tribe, Counsel for
Appellants, under date of February 21, 1980, and received by
this Office yesterday. This letter states that the proposed
Virginia Public Trial Act introduced in the 1980 General
Assembly Session at my request has been carried over to the
1981 Session.
I did suggest in oral argument that state legislation or
court rules would be the appropriate response to any problems
of closed trials violating the tradition of public trials or
to maverick rulings by trial judges. In this context, I .
argued that constitutionalizing one more aspect of a state
trial was not appropriate--especially in view of the highly
unusual circumstances of this case which involved the fourth
trial for the same offense and the lateness of the motion to
reopen.
As pointed out in footnote 10 at page 17 of our brief,
the decision to prepare and introduce legislation in Virginia
was made prior to the Appellants' app e al to this Court, and
these efforts were pursued at a. time when the lawyer for the
Appellants stated publicly that the Virginia Supreme Court's
denial of relief was not unexpected in the wake of Gannett
and th a t an appeal to the United St ate s Supr eme Cour t was not
anticipat e d.

The Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
February 27, 1980
Page 2
In view of some concern in the Virginia General Assembly
about enacting legislation on issues currently pending a
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, and after
consultation with the patron of our proposals, the bill was
carried over to the next Session without objection from this
Office. The proposed legislation, however, remains pending
before the House Courts of Justice Committee, which continues
to work on such bills until the next Session. House
Rule 24(a) provides that bills may be continued on the agenda
("carried over") for hearings and committee action.
If Counsel for appellant had felt it significant that
the legislation would not be enacted this year, he was free
to make his point in his rebuttal argument.
As Counsel for Appellees, I would appreciate your
bringing my comments to the attention of the Court in view of
Professor Tribe's letter.
Very truly yours,

~
Marshall Coleman
Attorney General
1/173

.........

'.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia and
Counsel for Appellees, hereby certify that on February 27,
1980, a copy of the enclosed letter was sent by first-class
mail, postage prepaid, to Laurence H. Tribe, Counsel for
Appellants, Griswold Hall 307, Cambridge, Massachusetts
02138.

~~
Marshall Coleman
Attorney General of Virginia
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CHAMBERS Or

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 27, 1980

Re:

79-243 - Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Enclosed is a Wang draft of the opinion in this
case, as delivered to the Printer.
I have refrained from relying on the Ninth
Amendment but the discussion of its genesis gives at
least "lateral support" to the central theme. The
Jefferson-Madison correspondence and other records seem
to make this worthwhile in terms of pointing out
Madison's rationale,
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The question presented in this case is whether the rig ~ ~
attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United

St~
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Constitution.
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In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for tl:J.24Inurde r of

.

~~L-1A,...

a hotel manager who had been found stabbed to de ~~
2, 1975.

Tried promptly in July 1976, Stevenson ~ic~

of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court of
Virginia.

The Virginia Supreme Court reversed

~e~Co~t~~
t~

in October 1977, holding that a bloodstained shi ~ ~~~~~
belonging to Stevenson had been improperly admitted into
~
7~LJ-.,t:v
evidence. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462,~ ~'
779

(1977).
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Stevenson was retried in the same court.

This second trial

ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be
excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available. 1
A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6,
1978, also ended in a mistrial.

It appears that the mistrial

may have been declared because a prospective juror had read
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial
began.

See App., at 35a-36a.

Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time
beginning on September 11, 1978.

Present in the courtroom when

the case was called were appellants Wheeler and McCarthy,
reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc.

Before the

triai began, counsel for the defendant moved that the it be
closed to the public:
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the
Courtroom.
I would like to ask that everybody be excluded
from the Courtroom because I don't want any information
being shuffled back and forth when we have a recess as to
what--who testified to what." Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close Trial to the Public,
2-3.
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection to
clearing the courtroom.

The prosecutor stated he had no

objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court.
Id., at 4.

Presumably referring to Virginia Code§ 19.2-266,

the trial judge then announced:

"(T]he statute gives me that

power specifically and the defendant has made the motion."

He

.
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.

then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all parties
except the witnesses when they testify."

Id., at 4-5 2 .

The

record does not show that any objections to the closure order
were made by anyone present at the time, including appellants
Wheeler and McCarthy.
Later that same day, however, appellants sought a hearing
on a motion to vacate the closure order.

The trial judge

granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the close
of the day's proceedings.

When the hearing began, the court

ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the trial;
accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave the
courtroom, and they complied.
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to the
entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court had
falied to consider any other, less drastic measures within its
power to ensure a fair trial.
on Motion to Vacate, 11-12.

Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing
Counsel

fo~

appellants argued that

constitutional considerations mandated that before ordering
closure, the court should first decide that the rights of the
defendant could be protected in no other way.
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was
the fourth time he was standing trial.

He also referred to

"difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that
he "didn't want information to leak out," be published by the
media, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the jurors.
Defense counsel argued that these things, plus the fact that

.
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"this is a s mall community," made this a prope r case for
closure.

Id., at 16-18.

The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had
made similar statements at the morning hearing.

The court also

stated:
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into consideration
in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Courtroom.
I
think that having people in the Courtroom is distracting to
the jury. Now, we have to have certain people in here and
maybe that's not a very good reason. When we get into our
new Court Building, people can sit in the audience so the
jury can't see them. The rule of the Court may be
different under those circumstances ...• " Id., at 19.
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court summed up
by saying:
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and it
doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else,
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's
motion." Id., at 20.
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to
continue the following morning "with the press and public
excluded."

Id., at 27: App., at 2la.

What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next day
was disclosed in the following manner by an order of the court
entered September 12, 1978:
"[I]n the absence of the jury, the defendant by counsel
made a Motion that a mis-trial be declared, which motion
was taken under advisement. At the conclusion of the
Commonwealth's evidence, the 'attorney for the de fend ant
moved the Court to strike the Commonwleath's evidence on
grounds stated to the record, which Motion was sustained by
the Court. And the jury having been excused, the Court
doth find the accused NOT GUILTY of Murder, as charged in
the Indictment, and he was allowed to depart." App., at
22a.3

..'
,.
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On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants'
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case.
Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs
of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from the trial
court's closure order.

On July 9, 1979, the Virginia Supreme

Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition petitions and,
· finding no reversible error, denied the petition for appeal .
•

App., at 23a-28a.
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both
our appellate, 28
jurisdiction.

28

u.s.c.
u.s.c.

§

1257(2), and certiorari

§

1257(3).

We postponed further

consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the
hearing of the case on the merits.

u.s.

(1979).

We

conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie 4 ; however,
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of
certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2103, we grant the petition.

The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the
case is moot.

This Court has frequently recognized, however,

that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the
practical termination of a contest which is short-lived by
nature.

See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.

368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 546-547 (1976).

If the underlying dispute is "capable of

repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), it is therefore not moot.
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision, "[f]inding no

- 6 -
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reversible error in the judgment complained of," App. at 24a,
sanctions total closure in this case and can reasonably be seen
as opening the way for similar closure orders at future trials
from which appellants, and others who desire to attend, are
likely to be excluded.

Most trials will be of sufficiently

short duration that a closure order "will evade review, or at
least considered plenary review in this Court."
Press, supra, at 547.

Nebraska

Accordingly, we turn to the merits.

II
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the
precise issue presented here has not previously been before
this Court for decision.

In prior cases the Court has treated

questions of whether publicity would impair a defendant's right
to a fair trial; as we observed in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427

u.s.

539, 547

(1976), "[t]he problems presented by

this [conflict] are almost as old as the Republic."
e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
Murphy v. Florida, 421
384

u.s.

u.s.

794

u.s.

See also,

368 (1979);

(1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell,

333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381

u.s.

532 (1965).

But

here for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a
H
"'
criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the

-------------~---------

unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration
that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior
right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding
consideration requires closure.

~

- 7 '

.
A.
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern
trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond
reliable historical records.

We need not here review all

details of its development; what is significant for present
purposes is that throughout its evolution, the criminal trial
has been open to all who cared to observe.
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court of
the hundred or the county court, which were attended by the
freemen of the community.

Pollock, English Law Before the

Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History 89 (1907}.

Somewhat like modern jury duty, attendance

at these meetings was compulsory on the part of the freemen,
who were collectively called upon to render judgment.
89-90; see also 1

w.

Id., at

Holdsworth, A History of English Law 10,

12 (1927}. 5
With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years
after the Norman Conquest, see, e.g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render
judgment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal
trials did not remain public.

When certain groups were excused

from compelled attendence, see The Statute of Marleborough,
1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79 & n.4, the
statutory exemption did not prevent them from attending; Lord
Coke observed that those excused "are not compellable to come,
but left to their own liberty."

2 E. Coke, Institutes of the

.·
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Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681) . 6
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements on
the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court held
in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance of public
attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect.

It was explained

that:
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be punished
after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered
indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the
S.S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis
added) .
From these early times, although great changes in courts
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the
public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was
decided.

Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the

definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that,
while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law
countries:
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men m~
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what
is saide." T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 101 (Alston ed.
1972) (emphasis added).
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state
of the "rule of publicity" that, "[h]ere we have one tradition,
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes."

F.

Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 30-31 (1904).

See

'.

-

9 -

also E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967):
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice,
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the
public have free access, ... appears to have been the rule in
England from time immemorial."

---

We have found nothing to suggest that
'

If

th ~p ~sump~ive

openness of the trial~ which English courts were later to call
'---

""-..

"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice," Daubney
v. Cooper, 10 B.

&

c.

237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B.

1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of
colonial America.
there are of early

In Virginia, for example, such records as
------criminal trials indicate that they were

open, and nothing to the contrary has been cited.

See A.

Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128-129 (1930):
Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies,
in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 405
(1907).

When in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assembly felt that

the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous unmannerlynes
of the people lost, and order, gravity and decoram which should
manifest the authority of a court in the court it selfe
neglected," the response was not to restrict the openness of
the trials to the public, but instead to prescribe rules for
the conduct of those attending them.

See Scott, supra, at 132.

In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly
recognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony.
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for

The

~
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example, provided:

"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of
causes, civil or criminal, any person or person,
inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and
attend the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or
any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that
· justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert
manner." Reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R.
Perry ed. 1959). See also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of
Rights: A Documentary History 129 (1971).
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also provided
"[t]hat all courts shall be open ... ," Sources of Our Liberties,
supra,

, at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this

declaration was reaffirmed in section 26 of the Constitution
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776.
271.

See 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at

See also Sections 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of

Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80.
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness to
those who wished to attend.

Perhaps the best indication of

this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebec which
was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas Cushing,
Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and approved by the First
Continental Congress on October 26, 1774.

1 Journals of the

Continental Congress, 1774-1789 at 101, 105 (1904).

This

address, written to explain the position of the colonies and to
gain the support of the people of Quebec, is an "exposition of
the fundamental rights of the colonists, as they were
understood by a representative assembly chosen from all the
colonies."

1 Schwartz, supra, at 221.

Because it was intended

for the inhabitants of Quebec, who had been "educated under

.,
.,
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another form of government" and had only recently become
English subjects, it was thought desirable for the Contintental
Congress to explain "the inestimable advantages of a free
English constitution of government, which it is the privilege
of all English subjects to enjoy."

1 Journals 106.

"[One] great right is that of trial by jury. This
provides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be
taken from the possessor, until twelve of his
unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who
from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be
acquainted with his character, and the characters of the
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to
face, in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse
to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against
him .•.. " 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added).

/:±1~~

B.

The historical evidence demonstrates co; tlusively that a~

--- -----

the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
.....

....._....

......

both here and in England had long been presumptively open.
This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been
recognized as an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-American
trial.

Both Hale in the seventeenth century and Blackstone in

the eighteenth saw the importance of openness to the proper
functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on
secret bias or partiality.

See, e.g . , M. Hale, The History of

the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th ed. 1820); 3
Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373.

w.

Jeremy Bentham not only

recognized the value of open justice but in fact regarded it as

.

..

-

..
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the keystone:
"Without publicity, all
are insufficient: in
comparison of public·
, all other checks are of small
account.
Recordat' n, appeal, whatever other institutions
might present t
mselves in the character of checks, would
be found to o
rate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks
·in reality, as checks only in appearance."
1 J. Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827) .7
on the values of openness were by no means
the English.

Foreign observers of

English criminal procedure in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries came away impressed by the very fact that
they had been admitted to the courts, as many were not in their
own homelands.

See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English

Criminal Law 715 & n.96

(1948).

They marveled that "the whole

juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P.J. Grosley, ~Tour
to London; or new Observations on

Engl~nd

142 (Nugent trans.

1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717, and one
commentator declared that:
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists in
publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the
extraordinary despatch with which business is transacted.
The publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing.
Free access to the courts is universally granted." C.
Goede, A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans.
1822) (emphasis added).
The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of
fairness was not lost on them:
"[T]he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly
exposed to public animadversion; and this greatly tends to
augment the extraordinary confidence, which the English
repose in the administration of justice." Goede, supra, at
215.
This last observation raises the important point that
"[t]he publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of

- 13 much broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of
testimony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 at p. 435
rev. 1976).

8

(Chadbourn

The early history of open trials in part

reflects the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant
community therapeutic value.

Even without such experts to

frame the concept in words, people sensed that, especially in
the administration of criminal justice, the means used to
achieve justice must have the support derived from public
acceptance of both the process and its results.

When a

shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows.
Punish 130-131 (1956).

See H. Weihofen, The Urge to

Thereafter the open processes of

justice serve a prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion.

Without an

awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are
underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are
frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful
"self-help", as indeed they did regularly in the activities of
vigilante "committees" on our frontiers.

"The accusation and

conviction or acquital, as much perhaps as the execution of
punishment, operate[) to restore the imbalance which was
created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the
temporarily lost feeling of security, and, perhaps, to satisfy
that latent 'urge to punish.'"

Mueller, Problems Posed by

Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110
1, 6 (1961).

u.

Pa. L. Rev.

- 14 Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the
vigilante the enforcement of the criminal laws, but they cannot
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural
yearning to see justice done--or even the urge for
retribution.

The crucial prophylactic aspects of the

administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no
community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner
[or]

in any covert manner."

Supra, at

It is not enough

to say that results alone will satiate the natural community
desire for "satisfaction."

A result considered untoward may

undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been
concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a
reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has
been corrupted.

To work effectively, society's criminal

process "must satisfy the appearance of justice,"
United States, 348

u.s.

Offutt v.

11, 14 (1954), and the appearance of

justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting"
form of trial became too cumbersome, twelve members of the
community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but the
community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of
trials.

The right to attend was in a sense a "right of

visitation" which enabled the people to satisfy themselves that
justice was in fact being done.
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing.

,,

When a criminal trial is

- 15 conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both
for understanding the system in general and its workings in a
particular case:
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material
· advantage.
Not only is respect for the law increased and
intellegent acquaintance acquired with the methods of
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is
secured which could never be inspired by a system of
secrecy." 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438. See also 1 Bentham,
supra, at 525.
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance
at court was a common mode of "passing the time."
Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6.

See, e.g., 6

With the press,

or reality of the real life drama once available only in the
courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespread

-'

pastime.

.,

Ye~'.'. [i]

.r• _ _ _

t

is not unrealistic even in this day to

-

believe that public inclusion affords cJ._t.i zen.s a form of legal
education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair
administration of justice."
87-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807

State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78,
(1966).

Instead of acquiring

information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of
mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly
In a sense, this

______

.__
validates media claim of functioning as "surrogates"
for the

public.

While media representatives enjoy the same right of

access as the public, they often are provided special seating
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in
.L

...,....--.....

~

);

understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the

- 16 functioning of the entire criminal justice system ...• "
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427

u.s.

539, 587

(Brennan, J.,

concurring).

c.
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to
conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.

This

without a direct holding on

conclusion is hardly novel;

the issue, the Court has voiced its recognitiion of it in a
variety of contexts over the years 9 .

u.s.

Levine v. United States, 362

Even while holding, in

611 (1960), that a criminal

contempt proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved:
"[W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment only for 'criminal
prosecutions,' that provision is a reflection of the
notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.' ... [D]ue process demands
appropriate regard for the requirements of a public
proceeding in cases of criminal contempt .. as it does for
all adjudications through the exercise of the judicial
power, barring narrowly limited categories of
exceptions. V"' ." Id., at 616 (citations omitted) .10
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979), both the majority, 443
dissenting opinions, 443

u.s.

u.s.

at 384, 386 n.l5, and

at 423, agreed that open trials

~

were part of the common law

.: '·

t r adition. ~

- 17 Despite the history of criminal
open since long before the Constitution,

~~

r(~~~
, t:f- I._;-~

presumptively
State presses its

contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials.

Standing alone,

this is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent
an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials. 1 1

--------------------~---------------------------!!!.
A.

______

The First Amendment
._....,. guarantees "freedom of speech [and] of
the press;
assemble."

[and] the right of the people peaceably to
The latter has been described as a right which is

"cog~ate to those of free speech and free press and is equally

fundamental."

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364

(1937).

When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it
was contended that there was no need separately to assert the
right of assembly because is was subsumed in freedom of
speech.

Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that inclusion of

"assembly" among the enumerated rights would tend to make the
Congress
"appear trifling in the eyes of their constituents .... If
people freely converse together, they must assemble for
that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right which
the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never
would be called in question .... " 1 Annals of Congress 731
(1789).
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee,
he went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's

~

·.,

- 18 purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people by listing
them, "they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of
rights," but this was unnecessary, he said, "in a Government
where none of them were intended to be infringed."

1 Annals of

Congress 732.
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times
"such rights have been opposed," and that "people have ... been
prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions:"
[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of
authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of
rights.
If the people could be deprived of the power of
assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be
deprived of every other privilege contained in the
clause."
Ibid.

R..

The motion to s1\ike "assembly" from the list of rights was
defeated.

Id., at 733.

~~

This background emphasizes the common origin and affinity
~-------------,,__________________________________________

between the guarantees of speech,

~s

and

~

,\

ItifJ~

ass~bly.

clear that from the outset the right of assembly was regarded
not only as as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the
other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately
linked by the draftsmen, but also as an independent right which
is not merely cumulative.

People assemble in public places not

only to speak or to take action, but also to listen, observe,
and learn; indeed, they may "assembl[e]
purpose,"

for any lawful

Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 519

of Stone, J.).

(1939)

(Opinion

More recently we characterized the right to

assemble as "the right of the people to gather in public places
for social or political purposes."

Coates v. City of

'·'·

- 19 Cincinnati, 402

u.s.

611, 615 (1971).

Among the protections of the right of assembly is the
guarantee of access to public places at which the people have
~~-------------~------------

traditionally gathered.

In Hague v. C.I.O., supra, at 515, Mr.

Justice Roberts reminded that:
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens."
The right to attend and observe criminal trials, which have
been open to the public since ancient times,

thu~_can

be seen

as inherent in the freedom of assembly.

-------

It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill
of Rights was in large part drafted in reaction to restrictions
on such rights in England.

See, e.g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2,

c. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, c. 8.

As we have shown, the right

of Englishmen to attend trials was not similarly limited; but
it would be ironic indeed if the very historic openness of the
trial could militate against protection of the right to attend
it.

The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from

those abuses which led the Framers to single out particular
rights.

The very purpose of the First Amendment is to

guarantee all facets of each right described; its draftsmen
sought both to protect the "rights of Englishmen" and to
enlarge their scope.
263-265 (1941).

See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,

- 20 "There are no contrary implications in any part of the
history of the period in which the First Amendment was
framed and adopted.
No purpose in ratifying the Bill of
Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of
the United States much greater freedom of religion,
expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great
Britain had ever enjoyed." Id., at 265.
The expressly guaranteed freedoms of speech, press, and

~are

the

co~on

core purpose of informing people on

the functioning of their government.

And it would be difficult

to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and
importance to the people than how their public servants
actually administer criminal justice; recognition of this
pervades the centuries of history of open criminal trials.
That the right to attend may be exercised by people less
frequently today when information as to trials generally
reaches them by way of print and electronic media in no way
alters the basic right.

Instead of relying on personal

observation or reports from neighbors as in the past, most
people receive information concerning trials through the media
whose representatives "are entitled to the same rights [to
attend trials] as the general public."

Estes v. Texas, supra,

at 540.

·-

It is not crucial whether we describe this right of
a} tend ~c~_ to hear, see, and communicate observations
concerning a trial as a "right of access" or a "right to gather
information."

We have recognized that "without some protection

for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1 972).

The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish reports

•" .

,:
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of a trial would lose much meaning if the right to observe it
were totally foreclosed.

Thus the right of access to places

traditionally open to the public, such as criminal trials, may
be seen as assured by the amalgam of First Amendment
guarantees; but at the very least it is embraced in the
~

guaranteed right to assemble in such places to observe criminal
~

trials.

The doors to these trials having been traditionally

open, save for those unusual situations where openness would
jeopardize a higher right, they can be closed only to protect
such a right.12
The debates over the need for a Bill of Rights also support
this conclusion.

There were some who thought--and not without

good reason--that there were dangers in undertaking to catalog
some rights because of the attendant risk that other equally
important rights, not expressed, would be treated as not
guaranteed. 13

In a letter to Thomas Jefferson in October of

1788, James Madison gave reasons why he, although "in favor of
a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in an important light" up
to that time:

"I conceive that in a certain degree ... the

rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the
federal powers are granted."

He went on to state "there is

great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite
latitude."

5 Writings of James Madison 271 (Hunted. 1904).

On the floor of Congress the following June, Madison offered
this explanation of the clause that eventually became the Ninth

.
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Amendment:
"It has been objected also against a bill of rights,
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of
power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by
implication, that those rights that were not placed in that
· enumeration, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of
the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system;
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last
clause of the fourth resolution." 1 Annals of Cong. 439
(1789).
The last clause of Madison's fourth resolution provided:
"The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as
to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such
powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution." 1
Annals of Cong. 435.
Madison's comments reveal clearly that the Ninth Amendment
was intended to function as a sort of constitutional "saving
clause," which, among other things, would serve to foreclose
application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim that the an
affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those
not expressly defined. See, e.g., 2 J. Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 651 (5th ed. 1891).
Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served
to allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing
certain guarantees could be read as excluding others.
This Court's interpretation of the enumerated rights has
neither followed the maxim of exclusivity nor totally ignored
it.

Notwithstanding the appropriate caution exercised against

...,

..

- 23 reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined,
the Court has determined that certain unarticulated rights are
implicit in enumerated guarantees.

For example, the rights of

-

association and of privacy, the rights to be presumed innocent
_:.---

and to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, are
not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution or Bill of
Rights.

Yet these important but unarticulated rights have

nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in
common with explicit guarantees.l 4

We see that, in a sense,

one of Madison's objectives has thus been fulfilled; certain
fundamental rights have been recognized by the Court as
indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.
B.

Given the right of the public to attend criminal trials,
guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we turn
to the closure order entered in this case.

Despite the fact

that this was the fourth trial of the accused and that none of
the prior trials had been closed, we find nothing in the record
to indicate an imperative need for closure; nor is there
anything to suggest that alternative solutions would not meet
the need to ensure fairness.

See, e.g., Nebraska Press

Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-565; Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384

u.s.

at 357-362.

There was no showing that any

problems with witnesses could not have been dealt with by their
exclusion from the courtroom or their sequestration during the

I.

"
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trial.

See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384

u.s.,

at 359.

There is

nothing to indicate that sequestration of the jurors would not
have prevented the reception by them of any improper
information.

All of the alternatives admittedly present

difficulties for trial judges, but none are beyond the realm of
the manageable.

In short, no reason adequate to support

closure was shown here; absent an overriding interest
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be
open to the public.

Accordingly, the judgment under review is

reversed.
Reversed

- 25 -

FOOTNOTES
· lA newspaper account published the next day reported the
mistrial and went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in
Stevenson's original conviction was a bloodstained shirt
obtained from Stevenson's wife soon after the killing. The
Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the shirt was
entered into evidence improperly." App., at 34a.
2virginia Code § 19.2-266 provides in part:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be
felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its
discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not
be violated."
3At oral argument, it was respresented to the Court that
tapes of the trial were available to the public as soon as the
trial terminated. Trans. of Oral Arg., at 36.
4 In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266
was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the
Virginia courts to invoke our appellate jurisdiction.
"It is
essential to our jurisdiction on appeal ... that there be an
explicit and timely insistence in the state courts that a state
statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution,
treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never
explicitly challenged the statute's validity.
In both the
trial court and the state supreme court, appellants argued that
constitutional rights of the public and the press prevented the
court from closing a trial without first giving notice and an
opportunity for a hearing to the public and the press and
exhausting every alternative means of protecting the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure
explicitly to challenge the statute, we view these arguments as
constituting claims of rights under the Constitution, which
rights are said to limit the exercise of the discretion
conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A)n attack on
lawless exercise of authority in a particular case is not an
attack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the
authority .... "). Such claims are properly brought before this

..
•.
'•,
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Court by way of our certiorari, rather than appellate,
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kulka v. California Superior Court,
436 u.s. 84, 90 n.4 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 u.s. 235,
244 & n.4 (1958). We shall, however, continue to refer to the
parties as appellants and appellee.
See Kulka, supra.
· 5That there is little in the way of a contemporary record
from this period is not surprising.
It has been noted by
historians, see E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law 3-4
(2d ed. 1922), that the early Anglo-Saxon laws "deal rather
with the novel and uncertain, than with the normal and
undoubted rules of law .... Why trouble to record that which
every village elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful
invader ... insists on a change, is it necessary to draw up a
code." Ibid.
6coke interpreted certain languge of an earlier chapter
of the same statute as specifically indicating that court
proceedings were to be public in nature:
"These words [In
curia Domini Regis] are of great importance, for all Causes
ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of
the King's Courts openly in the King's Courts, whith~~all
persons may resort .... " 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of
~ngland 103 (6th ed. 1681) (emphasis added).
?Bentham also emphasized that open proceedings enhanced
the performance of all involved, protected the judge from
imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public.
Bentham, supra, at 522-525.

1

8A collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility
that someone in attendance at the trial or who learns of the
proceedings through publicity may be able to furnish evidence
in chief or contradict "falsifiers." 6 Wigmore, supra, at
436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences.
IQ., at 436
& n.2.
9"of course trials must be public and the public have a
deep interest in trials." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"The trial is a public event. What transpires in the court
room is public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
374 (1947) (Douglas, J.).
"[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state,
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or municipal court during the history of this country.
Nor
have we found any record of even one such secret criminal
trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star
Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted
people secretly is in dispute .... This nation's accepted
practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has
its roots in our English common law heritage. The exact
· date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long
before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of
the ancient institution of jury trial."
In re Oliver, 333
u.s. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (footnotes omitted).
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the
public should know what goes on in courts by being told by
the press what happens there, to the end that the public
may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair
and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338
U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as
to what occurs in its courts, ... reporters of all media,
including television, are always present if they wish to be
and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open
court .... " Estes v. Texas, 381 u.s. 532, 541-542 (1965)
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring) (The Court-ruled, however, that the televising
of the criminal trial over the defendant's objections
violated his due process right to a fair trial.)
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of
silence has long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American
distrust for secret trials.'" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.).
lOThe Court went on to hold that, "on the particular
circumstances of the case," 362 u.s., at 616, the accused could
not complain on appeal of the "so-called 'secrecy' of the
proceedings," id., at 617, because, with counsel present, he
had failed to object or to request the judge to open the
courtroom at the time.

in ~nett,

~trial

llThe Court
supra, dealing with a
\
suppression hearing, d1d not reach or decide the question of )
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right
of members of the public to attend criminal trials. See 443
U.S., at 392 & n.24.
12we have no ocassion here to define the circumstances in
which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the
public. Cf., e.g., 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1835 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976).

~
~
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13see, e.g., A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84:
"I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the
sense and to the extent in which they are contended for,
are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but
· would even be dangerous.
They would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted~ and, on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted.
For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance,
should it be said that liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions
may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision
would confer a regulating power~ but it is evident that it
would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretense for claiming that power."
14see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 449 (1958) (right
of association)~ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965)
and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy)~
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) and Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S-.-478, 483-486 (1978) (presumption of
inno~ence) ~ In re Winship, 397 u.s. 358 (1970)
(standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt)~ United States v. Guest, 383
u.s. 745, 757-759 (1966) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
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BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 ( 19'79), held th!lit
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to
·the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the }Yress.
·-The instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its own force and as applied to the "States thi'ough
'the Fourteenth 'Amendment, secures the public an independent
"right of access to trial proceedings. Because I"Mlieve that the
First Amendment:r-of itself and as applied to the States
·through the · Fourteenth Amendment:r-secures such a public
· right of access, -r agree with the Court that, without more,
agreement of the tfiai juclge and the parties cannot constitu•
. 'tiona1ly close a triai to the ptib1ic.1
JusTICE

' 1 Df course, the Sixtb Amendment remains the source of the accused's
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from other
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a
·work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping.
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly,
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process.
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960) ; cf. In re
Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment due process).
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I
While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First.
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may
not be suppressed. see. e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. - , - {1979) (BRENNAN, . J., dissenting}~. Nebraska Press Assn: v.
-stuart, 427 U. 539. 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring in judgmeJ:tt); Ne.w York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U . .S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinio~); Ne-ar
.v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (19?1). t_he First A:mendment has not been viewed by the Court_ in.. ap ~e~tings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the. correlative
·freedom of access to information, see. e. g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.-S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
·- 1, 16-17 (1965); see also Jfouchins v. K!JED, 4~8 U. _S. 1, 8-9
. (1978) (opinion of .BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J.,
concurring in the .judgment); _Gannet.t _Co. v. _De_Pasquile,
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, .J., concurring). But cf. iii.,
at 397-398 (POWELL,.J., concurring); lfouc_hins, mpra, at 2738 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (PowELL, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 839_:842.
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment
.in every circumstance. Read. with care and. in context. our

s..

Analogously, racinl segregation has been found. independently offcn:;ive
to the Equal Protection and Fifth Amendment Due Proress Clauses. Compare Brown v. E.oard of Education, 347_ U.S. 483, 49& (1954), with Bolling
v. Shm·pe. 347_ U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) .
2 A conceptually separate, yet related , question is whether the media
should enio~· greater access rights than the general public. See, e. g.,
SCJxb.e v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
4i7 U. S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contention is at stake here.
Sinre the media's right of access is at least equal to tha.t of the general
public, see ibid., thiR case is resolved by a decision that the state statute
unronstitutionally re~tricts public acress to trials . As a ]Jractical matter;·
however, the in::;titutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary
3; right of access because it serves as the "agent " of interested citizens,

of

~~1~ £_~nn~l~ i?foV?~tion a~o-~~ tri~ls

t?,a l~l~~~ ~W~~er of in~ivi~it{,a~~-

·

79-243-CONCUit
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA

3

decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.
See Houchins, supra, ·at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831832 (same); Estes v. Te:t:a.~, 381 U. S. 532. 541-542 (1965)
(television in courtroom); Ze·mel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17
, (1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deHy that public
access to informa.tion may at times be implied by the First
Amendment and the principles which animate it.
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to
gather information. Customari1y, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communication between speaker
and listener. When so emp1oyed aga:inst prior restraints, free
speech protections are a1most insurmountable. See Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971)
(per curiam opinion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). But the First Amendment
·embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
'Communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
slructural ·role to play in securing and fostering our republican
'System of self-government. See United States v. Carotene
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144. 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233. 249-250 (1936); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Brennan , supra, at 176177; Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Emerson,
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob~ems , 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York

,-
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'Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic 'behavior-must be informed. The structura:l
modelliiiks the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entai:Is
·solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication. 8
However, because uthe stretch of this protection is theoretica1ly endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked
w!th discrimination and temperance. For so far as the participating citizen's need for information is concerned, "[t]here
-are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
'ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow."
Zemel v. Rusk, supra. 381 U. S .. at 16-17. An assertion of the
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed
by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded. 4
s ThP technique of deriving specific· right. from the structure oi our
constitutional govPrnmcnt, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The
right of suffragP has been inferred from the nature of "a free and dcmocrntie Rocict~·" and from its importnnce a~ n "preservative of othPr basic
civil and political rights . . . ." Reunolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561-562
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. "· Rochiguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n. 74 (1973).
So, too, the explicit frpedoms of speech, petition, and a8sembl:v have
yielded a correlative guarnntee of certain a8Sociational activities. NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). Se<' also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34
(indicating that rights may be implicitly rmbeddecl in the Con~titution); ul.,
at. 62-()3 (BR~;NNAN , J., di~enting); id., at 112-115 (MAHSHALL, J., clisf'f'lll)ng) ; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (BH~<:N
NAN, J., concurring).
4 Analogously, we have been somewhat cautiou"' in hppl~· ing First
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and nonpictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expres·s1on that. for practical purposes it partakes of the same trano,ceudental
constitutional value as pure speech. See, e. g., 'l'inker v. Des Moines
School District. 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969). Yet where the connection betwt>en rxprei'.Sion and action is percein:-d a::. mon• tenuou;:, c·om·
·mupicative interests may be overridden by eompeting social values. See1
<t~. g., Hu(lhe;s v. Superior Court, -339 U.S. 460, 464-465 (l9q0),
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"'' This judicial task is-as much a matter of sensitivity to prac-·
tical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a
right of access has sp~cial force when drawn from an enduring
and vital tradition of public entree to -particular proceedings
or information. Compare lrr te Winship~397 U.S. 358, 361.=..362'
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because
the. Constitution .. -carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of acl!es~ibility implies the favorable· judgment of experiet~ce. ~econd, the· value of access must be
·measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
. statements that all information bea.rs upon public issues; what
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular
goy_ernment process is important in terms of that very process.
. To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and .current practice with respect to open trials,
an<l: weigh the importance of public access to the trial process
itself.

II
. .
.
"This natioi1's ~ccepted practice of guar~nteeing a pu~lic
.tri~l to an ~ccused has it~. ~oots in . ~ur English 9ommon law
heritage." · In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257) 266 (194~~; s~~ Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLAcK·MuN, J., dissenting). · Indeed, historically and functionaily,
open trials have been closely associated with the development
of the fun-damental procedure of tri~l by ·jury. '!n re Oliver,
supra, at 266 ;nadit{;;The Right to a Public Trial, 6'"'f emp. ~L.
.,_. Q~ 381,-388 (f932}. 5 Pre-eminent English legal observers arid
'

s "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials,
' since the presence of a jury . . . already insured the presence of a large
part of the pi.lblic. We need scarcely be reminded that the jitry was the
pat1·ia, the 'country' and that it was in that. capacity and not as judges,
that it, was summoned." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial; 6 Temp.
L . Q. 381, 388 ( 1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *349 (!3th ed': 1800) (" trial oy jury ; called' a lso the trial per

tJ
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commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded
the public character of the common-law trial process. See
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81-82 (Hl70); o· 2 E .
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th ed. 168i); 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372373 (13th ed. 1800); 7 M. Hale. The History of the Common
Law of England 342-344 (6th ed. 1820); ~ 1 J. Bentham . Rationale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears
that "there is' little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil. having occurred at any time' in ·knoWn English
history." Gannett, supra, ·at 420 (BLACKM'tiN.T, dissenting);
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, 1L 22; Radin, supra. R.t
38~387.
;;.,..•
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English
settlers in America: The· earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public
trials. See Con·cessions and Agreements of ·West -New Jersey,
1677,- ch. XXIII; 9 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682,
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V. 10 HThere •is no evidence
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed
doors. . . ':'' 'Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425.
(BLACKMUN, J., 'dissenting). Subsequently framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. (J.,
Pennsylvania-Dec1aration of Rights, 1776, IX; 11 North Caro'lina Declaration of Rights. 1776, IX; 12 Vermont Declaration
of Rights, X (1777); 1 3 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S.,
pais, or b.tt the country"); T . Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79
'(1970 ed.).
6 First publi:;hed in 1583.
7 First published in 1765.
a First t>dition published in 1713.
u Quoted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary History
129 (1971).
10 /d., at 140.
11 /d., at 265.
12 !d., at 287.
ta /d.,. at 323.

.
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at' 267. "Following the ratification in 1791 of the Federal
-Constitution's Sixth Amendment, .. . . most of the original
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted
similar constitutionali provisions." lbid. 14 Today, the overwhelming majbrity of States secure the right to public trials.
Gannett, supra, at 414-415. n. 3· (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20:
This Court too has persistently defended the public charac.,
ter of the trial' process. Tn re Oliver established that the Due
Process Clause of the ·Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed
• C'riminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that
"[i] n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom. and the
universal requirement of our federal and state govern. ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law meaHs at least that
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." !d., at
273.15
To be sure, somr of these constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantee:, in the language
of the accu1*'d 's rights. But although tf1e Court has read the FedemJ
Constitution's explicit public trial provi;;ion, U. S. ConsL Amend. VI, as
benefiting thP defendant alone, it doe~ not follow that comparably worded
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gmmett Co. v. DePMquale,
supra. 443 U. S., at 425, and n. 9 (BLACKMUN, ,1., dio~;enting) ; cf. also
Mallott v. Alaska, Ata . - , - , n . 12 (1980) . And even if the
specific state public trial proiections must be invoked by defendants, those
state con><titutional clauses sti11 provide evidenc·e of the importance
attached to open trials by tl1e founder,; of our state government!:;. Indeed,
it rna~· have been thought that linking public triaL to the accused 's privileges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous repr!':lentative for
the popular interest.
1~ Notabl~·, Olive1· did not rest upon the simple incorporAtion of the
Si'Xth Amendment i11to the Fourteenth, b\1t upon notions intrinsic to due
prece$it, because the criminal ·cont<'mpt proceedings at issue in the case
14

•
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Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recognized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the
numerous 11 Checks and balances'' of our system, because 11 contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," ·id., at
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966) .
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public
trial guarantee 11 as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppression of political and religious heresies." Oliver, S'Upra, at 270.
Thus. Oliver a{)knowledged that open trials are indispensable
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms.
By the same token. a special solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings
upholding the right to report about the administration of
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the classic protections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communication, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation oi'
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system
to public inspection. 1 0 So, in upholding a privilege for repOI·ting truthful information about judicial misconduct proceedings, Landmark Cornrn'Unications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S.
829 (1978) , emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation
of a judicia.I disciplinary body implicates a major purpose of
the First Amendment-"discussion of governmental affairs,"
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. St'Uart, s'Upra, 427
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional gua.rantee against
were "not within 'all criminal prosecuti on ~' lo which [the Sixth] . . •
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 36:2 (J . S. 610, 616 ( 1960) ;
see also n. 1, supra.
16 As Nlr. Ju~ tice Holmc.>s pointc.>d out in his opinion for the Mussachusett o Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer. 137 Ma:;s. 392, 394
(1884) , "the privilege [to publii:lh reporti:l of judicial procc.>eding8] and the
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upou common ground .'l
See Lewis v. Levy, E!., Bl., & El. 537 (1858) .
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prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings .. . ." And Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon
the administration of justice." See 1'irne, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN. J., dissenting) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they
shall retain the necessary means of control over their
. t't
ms
1 u t'IOns. . . .") .
·Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's
own decisions manifest a common understanding that "[a]
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
·public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
As a matter of law and virtually immemoria.l custom, public
trials have been the essentially uHwavering rule in ancestral
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, 13upra, 333
·u.S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale suw·a. 443 U. .,
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432.(n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J .. dissenting) .17 Such abiding adherence to the principle of open
trials "reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which
·law should be enforced and justice administered." D'uncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).

III
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our
The dictum in Branzburg v.llayes, 408 U. S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that
"[n]ewsmen .. . may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are nece:s~:~ary to a:ssure a defendant
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary ; it simply note, that rights of
access may be curtailed where there are snfficiently l)OWerfttl countervail..
ing considerations. Sec ante, at 4.
17

•.
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judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes
v. Tex·as, supra, 381 U. S., at 538-539 (1965). But, as a feature of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves
other, broadly political, interests. and public access advauces
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses
specific structural significance.18
The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice.'" Levine v. United States , 362 U. S. 610, 616
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasqua'le, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see Cow·ley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they
are governed equitably. "That necessity underlies constitution~il provisions as diverse as the rule against takin~s without 'just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Cenler v.
Robins, U. S. - , - , and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal
Protection Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that
1 8 B~· way of analogy, we 'have fushionrd rulrs of criminal procedure to
serve intC'rests implicated in fhe trial proc es~ be~ide those of the defendant .
'For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only L~· the· accu~ed s
interest in vindicating his own rig'hts, but also 'in part by the independent
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" Sec, e. g., Terril v. Ohio. 392 U. S.
1, 12-1 3 (1968) , quoting Elki1•s v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 222 (1960);
United States v. Calundru, 414 U.S. :338, 357-359 (1\)74) (Blu:NNAN, J., -'-llsS'
dissenting) ; Olmstead "· United 8tates, 277 U. S. 438, 484 [(1928)
(Brandei ~, .T .. dit;Senting) ; id., at. 470 (Holmes, J., di~enting) . And four
Member:; of this Court. have insisted that criminal entrapment cannot, Lc
"countC'nauced " because the "obligation " to avoid "enforcement of the
'law by lawless mean ~ . . . goe~ beyond the eonvicticn of thr particular
defendant. before the court. Public confidence in the fair and houorablt~
admini~tration of ju ~ tic e . .. i:; the t runsceudmg value at :stake." She1·~
·man v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1P58) (Fraukfurter, J., concur~
ring in result).
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- demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One
major function of the trial; hedged Lwith procedural protections and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of
law, is to make that· demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra,
333 U. S., at 270, il~ 24.
Secrecy is profoundly ·inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public
access is essential, therefore. if trial adjudication is to achieve
the objective of ma.i ntaining public confidence in the administration of justice. See Ga·n nett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method' of
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a. pivotaf
role in the entire judicial process. and·. oy extension, in our
form of government. Under our system, fudges are not mere
umpires, but, in their own sphere, Tawmakers-a coordinate
branch of governrnent. 10 While individual cases turn upon
the controversies between parties, or involve particu18r prosecutions, court rulings ii.npose official and· practical consequences upon memoers of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsioility for tlie vitally important task of construto The interpretation and· application of con:stitutional and statutory law,
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special
con:straiilts and· iilformrd· by uniqur con:sidrrations. Guided and confined
oy the Con:stitution and pertinent statuteo:, judgPI:i arP obliged to hE' discerning, exercii;e judgment, and prE'I:icribP rulrs. Indeed, at timrs ,indges
wield· con:sidt>rablr authority to formulate legal policy in dc:si!!nated arras .
SPe, e. g.. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970): Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964) ; Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957) ; P. Arceda, Antitrust Analysis 45-46 (2d eel. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] . . . a generni
authority to do what common law courts usually do : to u~P certain customary techniques of judicial reasoning . . . and to develop, refine, and
bmovate in the dynamic common law tradition.").
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ing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as thet
trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern-:
mental proceeding.
It follows that the ~onduct of the trial is preeminently a
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio.
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 ( 1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J'.,
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public
access to trials acts as an important. check, akiu in purpose to
the other checks and balances that i11fuse our system of government. "The knowledge tha.t every criminal trial is subJect
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before
the court. Indeed, "'[w]ithout publicity, all other checks
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks
are of small account.l" Ibid., at 271. quoting 1 Bentham)
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *372; Hale. History of the Common Law 344 ; 1 J.
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931) .
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and
accurate factfinding. Of course. proper factfinding is to the
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil proceedings. But other, comparably urgeut, interests are also
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a continuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, therefore. is of concern to the public as well as to the parties.to
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding.
20 Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not punished
n\ay be shared by the geneml public, in u.ddltlon to the accused him~elf.
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"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws § 1834 (Chadbourn
Tev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that
"open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ...
where a witness may frequently depose that in private,
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn
tribunal."
'3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United
States, supra, at 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law,
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523.
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truth'finding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438
(1966).
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceed1ng.21 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element
of the trial process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes
structural importance in our 11 government of Iaws,' 1 Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
21 In advancing these pnTposes, the availability of a tria! tran~cript is
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced
appellate judge can attest, tf1e "cold'~ record' is a very i'mperfect reproduction of events tf1at transpi're i'n tl'1e courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that
publi'ci'ty serves as a. cnecfc upon t ri'al offi'ci'als, " [ r Jecorcfation .. . wonfd'
oo found to operate mther us cloak[] than check[] ; u;, cloak[J i'n rE'ali'ty,
as check[] only i'n appearance."' In re Olwer, supra, 333' U. S., al 27!,
quoting 1 Bentl'wm, R<tti'onale of Jlttdimn.D Evidence 52'4 ((1821.) ; seeo
llllmtluu!il\ swprw,. a:t Sil.T.-57&..

·~
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IV
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment publio
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced.
by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of
the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradition of public trials and the importance of public access to the
broader purposes of the trial process, tip the balance strongly
toward the rule that trials be open. 22 What countervailing
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now/ 8 for the statute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judge and parties. 24 Accordingly, Va. Code
19.2-266 violates the First a.nd Fourteenth Amendments, and
the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contrary
should be reversed.

22 The presumption of public trials is, of course, not at all incompatible
\vith reasonable restrictions lmpo~~ed upon courtroom behavior in the interests of decorum . Cf. lllirun's v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) . Thus, whe1\
engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to
allow public or press intrusion upon the huddle. Nor does this opinion
intimate that judges are restricted in their ability to conduct conferences
in chambers, inasmuch as such conferences are distinct from trial
proceedings.
28
For example, national security concerns about confidentiality may
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of trial proceedings,
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United State~ v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 714-716 (1974).
2
~ Significantly, closing a trial lacks even the justification for barring the
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of suppressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool hM
become, in a practical $Cnse, finite and subject to sequestration.
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Dear Chief,
Although I thought, and still do, that the
Sixth Amendment is the preferable approach to the
issue of public access to both pre-trial and trial
proceedings, particularly the latter, it does not
appear that the Conference is prepared to proceed
on this basis. Having this in mind, I join your
opinion based on the First Amendment and would expect to stay hitched if three or more Justices in
addition to myself join your opinion.
If there is
a Court only for the judgment, I may leave you and
say my own piece.
I should also add, that as I see it, your
invocation of the Ninth Amendment is unnecessary,
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press.
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its own force and as applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the
First Amendment-of itself and as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment-secures such a public
right of access, I agree with the Court that, without more,
agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitutionally close a trial to the public. 1
Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979).
ThaL the Sixth Amendment, explicitly establishes a public trial right
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from othet
provisiono of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping.
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address
central polit1ral concerns from a variety of perspective:;. Significantly,
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process.
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re
'Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment due procesl:l).
1
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may
not be suppressed, see, e. r;., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. - , (1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v.
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring in judgment); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 715-716 ( 1931), the First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washi-ngton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 ( 1974); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id.,
at 397-398 (PowELL. J., concurring); Houchins, supra, at 2738 (STEVENS, J .. dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (PowELL. J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817. 839-842
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our

-

Analogously, rarial srgregation has been found independently olfensive
to the Equal Protrrtion and Fifth Amrndment Due Prore~R Clnu~ef'. Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U . S. 4 3, 495 (1954), with Bolling
v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) .
2 A conceptually separate, yet related, qurstion is whether the media
should rnioy grPatrr acrr~s rights than the genrrnl puhlir . See, e. g.,
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U . S. 843, 850 (1974) ; Pe/l v Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contentiOn i~ at stak<' hrre.
Sinre the medirr's right of access is at least equal to that of the general
public, see ibid., this rase is resolved by a derision thai the state statute
unconst itutionall~r reRtrirts public access to trials . As a practical matter,
however, the institutional prrss i~ the likely, and fitting, chief benefiriary
of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interestt'd citizens,
and funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals
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decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.
See Houchins, supra, ·at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831832 (same); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541- 542 (1965)
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public
access to information may at times be implied by the First
Amendment and the principles which auimate it.
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to
gather information. Customarily, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communication between speaker
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971)
(per curiam opiuion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 ( 1979). But the First Amendment
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government. See United States v. Carotene
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144. 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-250 ( 1936); Stromberq
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 ( 1931); Brennan. supra, at 176177; Ely. Democracy and Distrust 93- 94 (1980) ; Emerson,
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 ( 1970); Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to SE'lf-Government (1948);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems. 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structuraf
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues
ehould be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, " New York
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic behavior-must be informed. The structural
model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication. 8
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoretically endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked
with discrimination and temperance. For so far as the participating citizen's need for information is concerned, " [t] here
are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow."
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16-17. An assertion of the
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed
by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded. 4
s The technique of deriving specific rights from the Rtrurtnre of our
constitutional government. or from other explicit right,, i ~ not novel. The
right of suffmge hns bren infrrred from the nature of "11 free nnd drmocrntic society" and from its importance as a "presrrva1iYe of other bnf'ir
civil and political rights . . . . " Reunolds " · Sims, 377 n. S. 533. 561-562
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34. n. 74 (Hl73).
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speerh, prtition, nncl a~sembly hnve
yi0ldcd a rorrelntiw guarantee of certain nssorintional artiviti0s. NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). See nlso Rodriguez , supra, at 33-34
(indicnting that rights may br implicitly emb0dded in the Constitution); id.,
at 62-63 (BRI-:NNAN, J., dissenting) ; id., at.ll2-115 (ilfAHSHALL, J., di"sonting); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (BHENNAN , J., concurring).
4 Analogously, we hnve been somewhat cautious in applying First
Amendment protections to communication by wa~· of nonycrbal nnd nonpirtorinl conduct. Some behavior is so intimnt0ly connected with expression that for practical purposPs it partak0s of the same tr::msrendPntal
ronstitutionnl value as pure speech. See, e. (]., Tinker v. D es Moines
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505--506 (1969) . Yet where the connection between expresi'ion nnd action is perceived as more tenuous, communicative interests may be overridden by compet ing sorinl values. See,
e. g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-465 (1950) .
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This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-362
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Second, the value of access must be
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
statements that all information bears upon public issues; what
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process.
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and current practice with respect to open trials,
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process
itself.
II
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law
heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) . Indeed, historically a.nd functionally,
open trials have been closely associated with the development
of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury. In re Oliver,
supra, at 266; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L.
Q. 381, 388 (1932) .5 Pre-eminent English legal observers and

!'

•f

.
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I'

5 "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury irials,
since the presence of a jury .. . already insured the presence of a large
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury wa~ the
patria, the 'country' and that it was in tha.t capacity and not as judges,
that it was summoned." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *349 (13th ed. 1800) ("trial by jury ; rRlled also thr triRI pP'I'
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commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded
the public character of the common-law trial process. See
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81- 82 (1970 ) ; 6 2 E.
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th eel. 1681); 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372373 (13th eel. 1800); 7 M. Hale, The History of the Common
Law of England 342-344 (6th eel. 1820); s 1 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears
that "there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English
history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN. J ., dissenting);
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, n. 22; Radin , supra, at
386-387.
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
1677, ch. XXIII; 9 Pennsylvania Frame of Government. 1682.
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V. 10 "There is no evidence
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425.
(BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting). Subsequently framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. g.,
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; 11 North Carolina Declaration of Rights, 1776. IX; 1 2 Vermont Declaration
of Rights, X (1777); 1 3 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. ,
pais, or by the country") ; T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79
(1970 ed.).
6 First published in 1583.
7 First published in 1765.
8 First edition published in 1713.
9 Quoted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History
129 (1971) .
1 0 !d., at 140.
11 !d., at 265.
12 !d., at 287.
18 !d., at 323.
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at 267. "Following the ratification in 17!.Jl of the Federal
Constitution's Sixth Amendment, . . . most of the original
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted
similar constitutional provisions." Ibid. 11 Today, the overwhelming majority of States secure the right to public trials.
Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n. 3 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ·;
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20.
This Court too has persistently defended the public character of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that
"[i]n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the
universal requirement of our federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of la.w means at ]east that
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." I d. , at
273. 15
14

To be 'ttre, some of these constitu1ions, such a. th<' Pennsylvnni::t
Declaration of Rights, couched their JHthlic trial11:uarantee~ in the lnngnage
of the nccul:'ecl 's rights. But nlthough the Court has read the Federal
Constitution'll explieit public trial provi~ion, U . S. Const. Amend. VI, ns
benefiting the defendnnt alone, it does not follow that romparnblv worded
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co . v. DePasquale,
su7Jra, 443 U. S., at 425, nnd n. !) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); rf. also
Mallott v. Alaska, Ala. - , - , n . 12 (1980) . And even if the
sperific state public trinl protections mu~t be invoked br defendants , those
state constitutional clauses still provide evidence of tlw importance
attached to oprn trials by the founder" of onr statr governments. Indeed,
it mar hnve bren thought that linking public trials to thr nrru~ed'~< privilege;; was the mo~t effective way of m;~uring a vigorom; rcprescnbt tive for
the popular intere;;t.
1 5 NotnbJ~r , Oliver did not rest upon the i;imple incorporation of the
Sixth Amcndmrnt into th<· Fourtrruth , but upon notions intrin~ir to duE>
process, brcau~e the criminal contempt proceedings at i~~ue in the rase

·.-.

.
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Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recognized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system, because "contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966).
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppression of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270.
Thus, Oliver acknowledged that open trials are indispensable
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms.
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings
upholding the right to report about the administration of
justice. While these decisions are impe11ed by the classic protections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communication , they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system
to public inspection. 10 So, in upholding a privilege for reporting truthful information about judicial misconduct proceedings, Landmark Communications. Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S.
829 (1978) , emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation
of a .i udicial disciplinary body implicates a major purpose of
the First Amendment- "discussion of governmental affairs."
id., at 839. Again, Ne braska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against
were "not within 'all criminal proFeeutions' to whi ch [the Sixth] . . .
Amendment applie!:<." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (19()0) ;
see also n . 1, supra .
16 As Mr . .Justice Holmes point ed out in his opinion fo r the 1\Ias::;a ehusetts Supreme .J udi rial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 1 :~7 Ma~s. 392, 394
(1884), " the privil ege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the
access of th e public to the courts stand in reason upon common ground ."
See Lewis v. Lev y, El., Bl., & El. 537 (1858 ).
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prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings .... " And Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that
"[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and
to briug to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon
the administration of justice." See Tirne, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 473- 474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they
shall retain the necessary means of control over their
. t't
ms
1 u t'wns. . . .") .
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's
own decisions manifest a common understanding that " [a]
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
As a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom, public
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, su'f)ra. 333
U. S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 386. 11. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) .n Such abiding adherence to the principle of open
trials "reftect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).

III
Publicity serves to advance severa.I of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed. the judicial) process. Open
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our
17 The dictum in Branzbura v. Hayes , 408 U . S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that
"rnJewsmen ... may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessa ry to assure a defendant
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of
access may be curtniled where there are sufficiently powerful counten·ail~
ing considerations. See ante, at 4.

'
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judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes
v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S., at 538-539 (1965). But, a.s a feature of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses
specific structural significance? 8
The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice.' " Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610. 616
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they
are governed equitably. That necessity underlies constitutional provisions as diverse as the rule against takings with18 By way of analogy, we have fushionell rules of criminal procedure to
serve intere~ts implicated in the trial process beside those of the defl?ndnnt.
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only b~ · the ncru ~e d's
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independrnt
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S.
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States. 3()4 U.S. 206, 222 (1960);
United States v. C'alandm, 414 U. S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BBENNAN, J.,
dis:sPnting) ; Olmstrad v. Ctl'itrd States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (Hl28)
(Brandeis, .J., di ~s? ntil'g) ; id .. at 470 (Holmes, J ., di:s!cnting) . And sevrral
Members of this Court. have in~isterl that criminal rntrapmcnt cannot be
"countenanced" becau::;e the '' obligation " to avoid "enforcement of the
law by lawless means ... goes beyond the convicticn of the particular
defendant before the court. Public confidenee in the fair and honorable
admini~trntiou of justice ... is thr transcending value at stakr. " Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. :369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in re~ult ; ~ee United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 42:3, 436-439 (1973)
(Douglas, .T., di:sl'enting) ; id., at 442- 443 (STEWART, .J. , di;:~~nting);
Sorrl'l!s \' . United States. 287 U. S. 4:35, 455 (1932) (oninion of Robert s,
J .); Casey v. United States, 276 lJ . S. 413, 423, 425 (1921:1) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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out just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, U. S. - , - , and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal
Protection Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that
demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protections and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra,
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24.
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that
procedural rights are respected. and that justice is afforded
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a pivotal
role in the entire judicial process. and, by extension, in our
form of government. Under our system, judges are not mere
umpires. but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate
branch of government.lfl While individual cases turn upon
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prose19 The interpretntion and application of constitutional and statutor~· lnw,
while not lrgiHlation, is lnwmnking, albrit of n kind that is subjrct to special
constraints and informPd h~· unique consideratiom;. Guidrd and confinrd
by the Conl:ititution and prrtinent statutes, judgrs are obligrd to be dif-'cerning, exerci:;e judgm<>nt, and prescribe rules. Inderd, at timr:< judgrs
wield <·ousidernblP nut horit~· to formula tr legal polir~· in deRignntrd area~.
See, e. g., llforaonP v. States Marine Lines. 398 U.S. 375 (1970): Banco
Nacional de Cuba " · 8abbatiuo. 376 U. S. 398 (1964) ; Trxtile Workers
Union v. Lincolu Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957): P . Arerdtt, Antitrust Analysi..;;: 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a genernf
authority to do whnt common law courts usually do : to UHe certain customary tE-chniques of jutlicinl reasoning ... and to develop, refinr, and
innovate ~n the dynm:nic comm.on law tradition!'),
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cutions, court rulings impose official and practical conse-.
quences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as the
trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine governmental proceeding.
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of government. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before
the court. Indeed, " 1 [ w] ithout publicity, all other checks
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, a.Il other checks
are of small account.'" Ibid., at 271, quoting 1 Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J.
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931).
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to .the
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil proceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a continuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, therefore, is of <;:oncern to the public as well as to the parties. 20
20

Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not puni:;hed
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Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding.
"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that
"open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ...
where a witness may frequently depose that in private,
which he will be ashamed to te~tify in a public and solemn
tribunal."
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United
States, supra, a.t 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law,
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523.
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truthfinding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438
(1966).
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceeding.21 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element
of the trial process itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes
may be shnred by the general public, in addition to the accused himself.
21 In advancing these purposes, the availability of a trial transcript is
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced
appellate judge can attel:lt, the "cold" record is a very imperfect reproduction of events thnt transpire in the courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that
publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, "[rlecordation ... would
be found to operate rather as cloak[] than check[]; as cloak[] in reality,
as check[] only in appearance." In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S., at 271,
quoting 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827); se&
~entham, supra, at 577-578 ..
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~tructural importance in our "government of laws, " lvf arbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
/

IV
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment public
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced
by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of
the specific structural Yalue of public access in the circumstances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradition of public trials and the importance of public access to the
broader purposes of the trial process, tip the balance strongly
toward the rule that trials be open.~ What countervailing
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now,":' for the statute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judge and parties. 24 Accordingly, Va. Code
19.2- 266 violates the First aud Fourteenth Amendments, and
the decision of the Yirginia Supreme Court to the contrary
should be reversed.
2

22 The preHunption of publil' trial~ is. of c·oHr;;e, not at all in compatible
with rca ~ouable rc:;tri<:tion ~ impo:;('d upou courtroom ])('IJ<t\·ior in the interests of decorum . Cf. Il/i11ois "· Allc~t. 397 U. S. 3a7 (1970). Thus, when
cngaginp; in intNdtnugp;; nt the bench, tlw trial judge is not rl'quircd to
allow public· or pre·" ~ int rur~ion upon tlw huddle. i\or do<'.' t hi" opinion
intimate that j11dgl'~ arc rr~trieted in their ability to eonduc·t conferences
in chambers, ina ~mueh a ~ such coufcrcnc c~ arc di ~ tinct from trial
prorecdi11gs.
"" For rxmnplr , national sec urit~· ronr·<•rns about ronfident iality may
somctimr!' warrant closures dming ~ cn s iti, · e portion s of 1rial prorccclings,
such ns tc,.:timony about state ;;ccret::;. Cf. U11it ed States "· Nixon, 418
U. S. 6K:l. 714- il6 (Hl74) .
21 Significantly, rinsing a triul ]H('k ~ r,·en the justifil'ation for b:uring the
door to pr<'t ria I lwa rings: the ncce~,.:it~· of pren•nting cli::~c mina tion of supJWCs:sible prejudil'inl e1·id<·nce to the pnblic before the jury pool has
become, in a Jmtetieal ~l'n ;;e, fiuitc and ~ ubj e ct to sequestration.

Qf'lltrt of tlrc ~nitclt $\tatts
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No. 79-243
~ichmond Newspapers, Inc., et al.,
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preme Court of Virginia,

v.
Commonwealth of Virginia et al.

[May-, 1980]
l\1R. JusTICE BRENNAN; concurring in the judgment.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the ·press.
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its own force and as applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the
First Amendmentr-of itself and as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendmentr-secures such a public
right of access, I agree with the Court that, without more,
agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitutionally close a tria.! to the public. 1
t Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's
bwn right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979) .
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a right from other
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping.
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly,
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth Amendment due process.
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re
Ol·iver, 333 U. S. 257 (i948) (Fourteenth Amendment due process).
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may
not be suppressed, see, e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. - , (1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v.
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring in judgment); New York ·Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S . 697, 715-716 (1931), the First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
supra, at. 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id.,
at 397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring); Houch-ins, supra, at 2738 (STEVENS, J., dissenting): Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (PowELL. J., diE:senting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 839-84·2
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our
Annlo~ously, racial segregation has been found independently offensive
to the Equal Protection nnd Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Compare Brown v. Board of Educat·ion, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954), with Bolling
v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
2 A conceptually separate, yet related , question is whether the media
shonld eniny greater access rights than the general public. See, e. g.,
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U . S. 843, 850 (1974) ; Pell v. Procunier,.
417 U. S. 817, 834-835 (1974) . But no such contention is at stake here.
Sinre the mrdia's right of access is at least equal to that of the general·
public, see ibid., this case is resolved by a decision that the state statuteunconstitutionally restricts public access to trials. As a practical matter,
however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief benefiriary
of a right of acress because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens~
~nc;l. funnels infon.n.ation a~u.t trl~ls t~ a la.rge nu.m ber of individuals ..

'~
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decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.
See Houchins, supra;at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (access
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831832 (same); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965)
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public
access to information may at times be implied by the First
Amendment and the principles which animate it.
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to
gather information. Customarily, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communication between speaker
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S., at 558-559 (1976); New
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S., at 714 ( 1971)
(per curiam opinion). See generally Brennan, Address, 32
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). But the First Amendment
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938): Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-250 (1936); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Brennan, supra, at 176177; Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Emerson,
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948);
Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues
~hQuld be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic behavior-must be informed. 8 The structural
model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication. 4
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoretically endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked
with discrimination and temperance. For so far as the participa.t ing citizen's need for information is concerned, " [ t] here

J

./'Thi8 idea has bePn forP;:;hadowed in Ml{. Ju:;'l'IcE PowELL's dissent in
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974):
"What. is at :;take here is the sociPtal function of the Fir;:;t Amendment
in pre;;erving free public dil:icussion of governmental affairs. No aspect.
of that cun,;titntional guarantee il:i more rightly treal:iured than it:; protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny. . . . '[The] ... First Amendment
is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent selfgovernment.' . . . It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular
self-determination and our abiding faith that the sure3t course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public
issues. And public debate must. not only be unfettered; it must also be
informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First
Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as
well as the right of free exprrl:il:iion.'' (Footnote and citations omitted.)
4 The technique of deriving specific rights from the structure of our
constitutional government, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The
right of suffrage has been inferred from the nature of "a free and democratic society" and from its importance as a "preservative of other basic
civil and political rights . .. .'' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561-562
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n. 74 (1973).
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speech, petition, and assembly have
yielded a correlative guarantee of certain associational activities. NAACP
v. Button, 371 U . S. 415, 430 (1963). See also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34
(indicating that rights may be implicitly embedded in the Constitution); id.,
at 62-63 (BRF;NNAN, J., dissenting); id. , at 112-115 (MARSHALL, J., dissent•
ing); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 · (1965) . (BREN...
NAN, J., concurring).

.'
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are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow."
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16-17. An assertion of the
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed
by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded. 5
This judicial ta.sk is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-362
(1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Second, the value of access must be
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
statements that all information bea.rs upon public issues; what
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process.
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and current practice with respect to open trials,
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process
itself.
II
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial to an a.ccused has its roots in our English common law
5 Analogously, we have been somewhat cautions in applying First
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and nonpictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expression that for practical purposes it partakes of the same transcendental
constitutioual value as pure speech. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969) . Yet where the connection between expression and action is perceived as more tenuous, communicative interests may be overridden by competing social values. Soo,
c. fl ., Huuhes v. Superior Court, 339 U, S. 460, 46.4-46,5 (1950),
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heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gan~.
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Indeed, historically and functionally,
open trials have been closely associated with t~e development
of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury. In re Oliver,
supra, at 266; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L.
Q. 381, 388 (1932). 0 Pre-eminent English legal observers and
commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded
the public character of the common-law trial process. See
T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 77, 81-82 (1970); 7 2 E.
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 103 (6th ed. 1681); 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *372373 (13th ed. 1800); 8 M. Hale, The History of the Common
Law of England 342-344 (6th ed. 1820); n 1 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827). And it appears
that "there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil, having occurred at any time in known English
history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 269, n. 22; ·Radin, supra, at
386-387.
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
6 "[The public trial] seems almost a necrssary incident of jury trials,
since the presence of a jury ... already insured the presence of a large
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the·
patria, the 'country' and that it was in that capacity and not as judges,
that it was summonea." Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp ..
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *349 (13th ed. 1800) ("trial by jury; called also the trial per
pais, or by the country"); T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) '('91
'(1970 ed .).
7 First publi~hed in 1583.
8 First publi~hed in 1765.
9 First eclition published in 1713..
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1677, ch. XXIII; 10 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682,
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V. 11 "There is no evidence
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425.
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Subsequently framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceedings. See, e. g.,
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; 12 North Carolina Declaration of Rights, 1776, IX; Js Vermont Declaration
of .Rights, X ( 1777); 14 see also In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S.,
at 267. "Following the ratification in 1791 of the Federal
Constitution's Sixth Amendment, . . . most of the original
states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted
similar constitutional provisions." Ibid. 15 Today, the overwhelming majority of States secure the right to public trials.
Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n. 3 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
see also In re Oliver, supra, at 267-268, 271, and nn. 17-20.
This Court too has persistently defended the public character of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due
Quoted in 1 B, Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documrntary History
129 (1971).
11 !d., at 140.
12 !d., at 265.
13 !d., at 287.
14 !d., at 323.
1 5 To be sure, some of these constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantees in the language
of the accused's rights. But although the Court has read the Federal
Constitution's explicit public trial provision, U. S. Canst. Amend. VI, as
benefiting the defendant alone, it does not follow that comparably worded
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co . v. DePasquale,
supra, 443 U. S., at 425, and n. 9 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); cf. also
Mallott v. Alaska, Ala. - , - , n. 12 (1980). And even if the
specific state public trial protections must be invoked by defendants, those
state constitutional clauses still provide evidence of the importance
attached to open trials by the founders of our state governments. Indeed,
it may have been thought that linking public trials to the accused's privileges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous representative for
the pop\1lar interest,
10
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that
"[i] n view of this nation's historic distrust of secret pro.ceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the
universal requirement of our fedenil and state . governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process oflaw means at least that
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." ld., at
273. 16
Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recognized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic
government: public access to court proceedings is one of the
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system; because "contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966).
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the public
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppression of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270.
Thus, Oliver acknowledged that open trials are indispensable
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms.
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings is evident in the Court's rulings
upholding the right to report about the administration of
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the cla.ssic protections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi1 0 Notably, Olive!' did not rest upon the simple incorporntion of the·
Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth, but upon notions intrinsic to due
process, because the criminal contempt proceedings at issue in the case·
were "not within 'all criminal prosecutions' to which [the Sixth] ..•.
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960);;
ll.e~ ali!A n. 1, sup1'a,
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.cation, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system
to public iuspection. 17 So, in upholding a privilege for reporting truthful information abo1,1t judicial misconduct proceed. .
ings, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S.
829 (1978), emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation
of a judicia.! disciplinary body implicates a. major purpose of
the First Amendment-"discussion of governmental affairs,"
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against
prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings ...." And Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon
the administration of justice." See Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they
shall retain the necessary means of control over their
. t'1tu t'wns. . . .") .
ms
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's
own decisions manifest a. common understanding that "[a]
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
As a matter of la.w and virtually immemorial custom, public
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, supra. 333
u. s., at 266-268; Gannett Co. V. DePasquale, supra, 443 u. s.~
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., dis1 7 As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his opinion for the Massachu-.
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsijel', 137 Mass. 392, 394
(1884), "the privilege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upon common ground,'"
~t;!e :(,ewis v. Levy, El., Bl., & El. 537 (1858).
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sen tin g) .18 Such abiding adherence to the principle of open
trials "reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).

III
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and
accura.te adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Estes
v. Texas, supra, 381 U. S., a.t 538-539 (1965). But, as a feature of our governing. system of justice, the trial process serves
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances
these objectives as well. · To that extent, trial access possesses
specific structural significance. 10
The dictum in Branz burg v. Haye, 408 U. S. 665, 684-685 (1972), that
"[n] ewsmen ... may be prohibited from attending or p\iblishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant
a fair trial ... ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of
access may be curtailed where there are sufficiently powerful counterYai!ing considerations. See ante, at 4.
10 By way of analogy, we have fashioned rules of criminal procedure to
serve interests implicated in the trial process beside those of the defendant.
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only b~· the acru~ed's
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independent
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S.
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elk-ins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BRENNAN,·J.,
dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J ., dissentiPg); id., at 470 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). And ~everal
Members of this Court haYe insisted that criminal entrapment cannot be
"countenanced" because the "obligation" to avoid "e11forcement of the
law by lawle>'s means . .. goes beyond the convieticn of the particular
defendant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorable
administration of justice . . . is the transcending value at stake." Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J ., coneurdng in rntlt ; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-439 (1973)
18

...
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The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted
in the common law, that 'justice must sa.tisfy the appearance
of justice.'" Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 429 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 394 ( 1884) (Holmes, J.). For a civilization
founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and
flourish, its members must share the conviction that they
are governed equitably. That necessity underlies constitutional provisions as diverse as the rule against takings without just compensation, see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, U. S. - , - , and n. 7 (1980\ and the Equal
Protecti01i Clause. It also mandates a system of justice that
demonstrates the fairness of the la.w to our citizens. One
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protections and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra,
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24.
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public tha.t
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428- 429 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting).
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a pivotal
role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in out
(Douglas, J ., di ~srnting) ; id., at 442-443 (S'rEWAHT, J. , dissenting);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 455 (1932) (opinion of Hoberts,
J.); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413., 423, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J .1
cu~senting).
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form of government. Under our system, judges are not mer~
umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate
branch of govermnent." 0 While individual cases turn upon
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at la.rge. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as the
trial is the mechanism for judicial faetfinding, as well as the
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine govern~
mental proceeding.
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 ( 1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of government. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse tha.t, in many cases, would
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before
the court. Indeed, "'[w]ithout publicity, all other checks
20 The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law,
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special
constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and confined
by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to be discerning, exercise judgment, and prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges
wield considerable authority to formulate legal policy in designated areas ..
See, e. g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970); Banco
'Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964); Textile Worker.;
Un·ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957); P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a general
authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques of judicial reasoning . . . and to develop, refine, and
\nnQv~te in the dynamic commo.A law trad\tion,''),

·.
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are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks
are of small account.'" Ibid., at ·271, quoting 1 BenthamJ
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J,
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931).
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to the
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil proceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons an
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a continuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, therefore, is of concern to the public as well as to the parties. 21
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding.
11
Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that
11
0pen examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ...
where a witness may frequently depose that in private,
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn
tribunal."
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. Unitea
States, supra, at 59-60; Hale, History of the Common Law,
345; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523.
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truthfinding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom2 1 Further, the interrst in insuring that the innocent are not punished·
tua? be shared by the general public, in addition to the accused himself:.
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mittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 433-434, 437-438
(1966).
Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers
the particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceeding.22 In that sense, public access is an indispensable element
of the trial process itself. Tria.I access, therefore, assumes
structural importance in our "government of laws," Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).

IV
As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment public
access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced
by the weight of historical practice arid by an assessment of
the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances. With regard to the case at hand, our ingrained tradition of public trials and the importance of public access to the
broader purposes of the tria1 process, tip the balance strongly
toward the rule that trials be open. 23 What countervailing
t 2 In advancing these purposes, the availability of a trial transcript is
no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself. As any experienced
appellate judge can attest, the "cold" record is a very imperfect reproduction of events that transpire in the courtroom. Indeed, to the extent that
publicity serves as a check upon trial officials, "[r]ecordation ... would
be found to operate rather as cloak[] than check[]; as cloak[] in reality,
as check[] only in appearance." In re Oliver, supra, 333 U. S., at 271,
quoting 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827); see
Bentham, supra, at 577-578.
n The pre:;umption of public trials is, of course, not at all incompatible
with reasonable restrictions imposed upon courtroom behavior in the interests of decorum. Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (1970). Thus, when
engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to
allow public or press intrusion upon ·the huddle. Nor does this opinion
intimate that judges are restricted in their ability to conduct conferences
in chambers, inasmuch as ·such conferences are distinct from trial
proceedings.

70-243-CON CUR
IUCHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA

1-1

interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-:
sumption of openness need not concern us now, 24 for the statute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judge and parties. ~ Accordingly, Va. Code
19.2-266 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, anc{
the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contrary
·'
!3h<iuld be reversed.
2

For rxamplr, national security concerns about. confidentiality may
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of trial proceedings,
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418
683, 714-716 (1974).
25 Significnntly, clo;,ing a trial lacks even the justification for barring t.he.
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of suppressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool has
becotne, in a practical sense, finite and subject to sequestration.
21
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MR. JUSTICE

S~EVENS,

concurring.

This is a watershed case.~/

An additional word of

emphasis is therefore appropriate.

Twice before the rourt has implied that any
restriction on access to information, no matter

gove~nmenta 1

~ow

severe

an~

no matter how uniustifiea, would be constitutiona 1 1v acceptab 1 e
so 1ong as it din not sing 1 e out the press

special

fo~

disabilities not applicable to the public at large.
dissent joined by MR.

JUS~ICE

BRENNAN and MR.

in Saxbe v. washins_ton Post ro., 417

u.s.

In a

JUS~1~E MARSBA~L

843, 850, MR. ,"TUS'T'IC'E

POWELL unequivocally rejected the conclus'on "that any
governmental restriction on press access to information, so
long as it is not discriminatory, falls
First Amendment concern."
And in Ho!:!chins v.

outsi~e

the purview of

Id., at 857 (emphasis in original).

KQED~nc.,

438

u.s.

1. ,

Jf)-40, 1 explained

at length why MR. ,JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. ,lUS'I'IC'E POWELL anr

T

1/ See gtevens, Some ~houghts about a General Rule, ?1 Ar~z.
L7 Rev. 599, 602 (1979): "Whereas t~e rourt has accorre~
virtually absolute protection to the fdissemination of
information or ideasl, it has never. squarely he1~ thnt the
racquisition of newsworthy matterl is ent~t ed to any
constitional protection whatsoever."
1

were convinced that "fa]n official prison policy of concea 1 ing
. . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the
flow of information at its source abridges

t~e

freeoom of

speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution."

Id., at 38.

Since M'R..

JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTirE BLACKMUN were unable to
participate in that case, a

major~ty

of

t~e

accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the

rourt

neit~er

contra~v

concJusion expressed in the prevailing opinions.2/

~odav,

however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds

t~at

an arbitrary interference with access to important information
is an abridgment of freedom of speech protecten by

t~e

~irst

Amendment.

It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more
reason to recognize a right of access toAav than it
Houchins.

~i~

in

For Houchins involved the plight of a segment of

society least able to protect itself, an attack on a long
standing policy of concealment, and an absence of anv
legitimate justification for abridging public access to
information about how its government operates.

In

t~is

case

w~

-2/ "Neither tile FTrst Amendment nor the Fou~teent11 Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or. sources
of information within the government's control." 438 U.S., at
15 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.).
"The First anc Fourteenth Amendments ro not guarantee the
public a right of access to information generaten or cnn~rolle~
by government .
~he Constitution roes no more than assure
the public and the press equal access once government has
opened its doors." Ia., at 16 (S~WtlAR'I', ,J., concurring).

are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in

t~P

community, we are concerned with an almost unique exception

~o

an established tradition of openness in the

con~uct

trials, and it is likely that the closure order was
by the judge's desire to protect the individual
the burden of a fourth criminal tria,

of criminal
motivate~

de~endant

from

.l1

In any event, essentjally for the reasons stated in Part TT
of my

Houchin~

opinion, 438

u.s.,

at 30-38, T agree that the

First Amendment protects the public and the press from
abridgment of their rights of access to informatjon about the
operation of their government, including the

Ju~icial

Branch:

given the total absence of anv record iustification for the
closure order entered in this case, that

or~er

violate~

t~e

First Amendment.
3/ Neither that likel.v motivation nor facts showing the risk
that a fourth trial would have been necessary without closure
of the third are disclosed in this record, however.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFB

Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et
Appellants,

al.,)

v.

On Appeal from the Su~
preme Court of Virginia~

Commonwealth of Virginia et al.
[June - , 1980]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the right to
attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States
Constitution.
I
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the murder of a hotel manager who had been found stabbed to
death on December 2, 1975. Tried promptly in July 1976,
Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder in the
Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the conviction in October 1977, holding that a
bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had
been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S. E. 2d 779 (1977) .
Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial
ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be
excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available. 1
1 A newspaper account published the next day reported the mistrial and
went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in Stevenson's original
conviction was a bloodstained shirt obtained from Stevenson's wife soon
after the killing. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the
hirt wa entered into evidence improperly." App., at 34a.

·'
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A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6,
1978, also ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial
may have been declared because a prospective juror had read
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial
began. See App., at 35a-36a.
Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time
beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom
when the case was called were appellants Wheeler and
McCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers. Inc.
Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that
it be closed to the public:
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the
Courtroom. I would like to ask that everybody be excluded from the Courtroom because I don't want any
information being shuffled back and forth when we have
a recess as to what-who testified to what." Trans. of
Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close
Trial to the Public, 2-3.
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection
to clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no
objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court.
!d., at 4. Presumably referring to Virginia Code § 19.2-266,
the trial judge then announced: "[T]he statute gives me that
power specificially and the defendant has made the motion."
He then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all
parties except the witnesses when they testify." !d., at 4-5.~
The record does not show that any objections to the closure
2

Virginia Code§ 19.2- 266 provides in part:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion , exclude from the trial any
persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial; provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated."

'
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order were made by anyone present at the time, including
appellants Wheeler and McCarthy.
Later that same day, however, apellants sought a hearing
on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge
granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the
close of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the
court ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the
trial; accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave
the courtroom, and they complied.
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to
the entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court
had failed to consider any other, less drastic measures within
its power to ensure a fair trial. Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978
Hearing on Motion to Vacate, 11-12. Counsel for appellants
argued that constitutional considerations mandated that before
ordering closure, the court should first decide that the rights
of the defendant could be protected in no other way.
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was
the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to
((difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that
he 11 didn't want information to leak out," be published by
the media, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the
jurors. Defense counsel argued that these things, plus the
fact that "this is a small conununity," made this a proper
case for closure. !d., at 16- 18.
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had
made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court
also stated:
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into consideration in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Courtroom. I think that having people in the Courtroom is
distracting to the jury. Now, we have to have certain
people in here and maybe that's not a very good reason.
When we get into our new Court Building, people can

(
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sit in the audience so the jury can't see them. Tha
rule of the Court may be different under those circumstances..•." !d., at 19.
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court
summed up by saying:
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and
it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else,
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's
motion." !d., at 20.
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to
continue the following morning "with the press and public
excluded." I d., at 27; App., at 21a.
What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next
day was disclosed in the following manner by an order of
the court entered September 12, 1978:
"[I]n the absence of the jury, defendant by counsel
made a Motion that a mis-trial e declared, which motion was taken under advisement. At the conclusion of
the Commonwealth's evidence, the attorney for the defendant moved the Court to strike the Commonwealth's
evidence on grounds stated to the record, which Motion
was sustained by the Court. And the jury having been
excused, the Court doth find the accused NOT GUILTY
of Murder, as charged in the Indictment, and he was
allowed to depart." App., at 22a. 3
On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants'
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case.
Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for
writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from
At oral argument, it was represented to the Court that tapes of the
trial were available to the public as soon as the trial terminated. Tr. of
Otal Arg., at 36.
8
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the trial court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia
Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition
petitions and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition
for appeal. App., at 23a-28a.
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both
our appellate, 28 U. S. C. ~ 1257 (2), allCl certiorari jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). We postponed further consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing
U. S. (1979). We conof the case on the merits. clude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie; 4 however,
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition.
The criminal tria1 which appellants sought to attend has
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the
In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266 was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke
our appellate jurisdiction. "It is essential to our jurisdiction on
appeal . . . that there be an explicit and timely insistence in the state
courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never explicitly challenged the statute's validity. In both the trial court and the state
supreme court, appellants argued that constitutional rights of the public
and the press prevented the court from closing a trial without first
giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the public and the
press and exhausting every alternative means of protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure explicitly to challenge
the statute, we view these arguments as constituting claims of rights
under the Constitution, which rights are said to limit the exercise of the
discretion conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v.
United States, 312 U. S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A]n attack on lawless
exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the constitutionality of a sta.tute conferring the authority ... .") . Such claims
are properly brought before this Court by way of our certiorari, rather
than appellate, jurisdiction. See, e. g., Kulka v. California Supe1ior Court,
436 U . S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, and
n. 4 (195H). We ~;hall, howrver, continue to refer to the partic'l:l as appellant:; and appellee. See Kulka, supra.
4
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case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, how~
ever, that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the
practical termination of a contest which is sho~lived by
nature. See, e. g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S.
368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 546-547 (1976). If the underlying dispute is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), it is therefore not moot.
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision, 11 [f] in ding no reversible error in the judgment complained of," App., at 24a,
sanctions total closure in this case and can reasonably be seen
as opening the way for similar closure orders at future trials
from which appellants, and others who desire to attend, are
likely to be excluded. Most trials will be of sufficiently short
duration that a closure order "will evade review, or at least
considered plenary review in this Court." Nebraska Press,
supra, at 547. Accordingly, we turn to the merits.

II
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the
precise issue presented here has not previously been before
this Court for decision. ln Gannett Co. Y. DePasquale, 443
U. S. 368 ( Hl79). the Court expressly left open whether a. right
of access to trials, as distinguished from hea.riugs on pretrial
motions. was constitutionally guaranteed. It did uot decide
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the
right of the public to attend, id., at 392, and n. 24, nor did the
clissc'nting opinion reach this issue. !d., at 447 (BLACKMUN,
J .. dissenting).
In prior cases the Court has treated questions involving conflicts between publicity and a defendant's right to a fair trial;
as W<' observed in l\rebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S.
539. 547 (1976). "lt]lw problems preseuted by this lcoufiict]
arc almost as old as the Republic." flee also, e. g., Gannett, \
supra; Murphy v. /?lorida, 421 U. S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v.
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Maxwell, 384 r. S. 333 ( 1966); Estes V. 'l'exas, 381 U. S. 532
(HJ65). But here for the first time the Court is asked to
decide whether a crimi11al trial itself may be closed to the
public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without
any demonstration that closure is required to protect the
defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other
overriding consideration requires closure.

A
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern
trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back beyond
reliable historical records. We need not here review all details of its development; what is significant for present purposes is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open
to all who cared to observe.
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court
of the hundred or the county court, which were attended by
the freemen of the community. Pollock, English Law Before
the Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History 89 ( 1907). Somewhat like modern jury duty,
attendance at these early meetings was compulsory on the
part of the freemen. who were called upou to re11der judgment. \
!d., at 89-90; see also 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English
Law 10, 12 (1927). 5
With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years
after the Norman Conquest, see, e. g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render judg5 That there is little in the way of a contemporary record from this
period is not surprising . It has been noted by hi torians, see E. Jenks,
A Short Histor~· of English Law 3-4 (2d eel. 1922), that the early AngloSaxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that
which every villnge elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful invader ... insists
on a change, is il nccPssary to draw up a code." Ibid.
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ment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal
trials did not remain public. When certain groups were
excused from compelled attendance, see The Statute of Marieborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79,
and n. 4, the statutory exemption did not prevent them from
attending; Lord Coke observed that those excused "are not
compellable to come, but left to their own liberty." 2 E.
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681).~r
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements
on the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court
held in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance
of public attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect. It
was explained that:
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the
S. S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis
added).
From these early times, although great changes in courts
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the
public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was
decided. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the
definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that,
Coke interpreted certain language of an earlier chapter of the same
statute as specifically indicating that court proceedings were to be public
in nature : "These words [In curia Domini Regis1 are of great importance,
for all Cnuses ought to be heard , ordered, and determined bt:>fore the
Judges of the King's Courts openly in the King 1s Courts, whither all persons may resort . ... " 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the taws of England 1()3;
(6th ed. 1681) (emphas.is added).
6

.

'

:'{9-243-0PINION
l'UCHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA

9

while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law
countries:
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses
what is saide." T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum 10~
(Alston ed. 1972) (emphasis added).
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state
of the "rule of publicity" that, "[h] e~;e we have one tradition,
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes." F. Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 31-32 (1904). See
also E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967):
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice,
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the
public have free access, .. . appears to have been the rule in
England from time immemorial."
We have found nothing to suggest that the presumptive
openness of the trial, which English courts were later to call
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice," Daubney
v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237. 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438. 440 (K. B.
1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of
colonial America. In Virginia, for example, such records as
there are of early criminal trials indicate that they were open,
and nothing to the contrary has been cited. See A. Scott,
Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128- 129 (1930); Reinsch,
The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in
1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 405
(1907). Inueed, when in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assembly felt that the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous
unmannerlynes of the people lost, and order, gravity and
decoram which should manifest the authority of a. court in
the court it selfe neglicted ," the response was not to restrict
the openness of the trials to the public, but instead tt0 pre.
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scribe rules for the conduct of those attending them. See
Scott, supra, at 132.
In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly rec..
ognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony. The
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for
example, provided:
"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes,
civil or criminal, any person or person, inhabitants of the
said Province may freely come into, ~d attend the said
courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals
as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be
done in a corner nor in any covert manner." Reprinted
in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959). See
also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary
History 129 (1971) .
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also provided "[t]hat all courts shall be open . . . ," Sources of Our
~iberties, supra, at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this
declaration was rea.ffirmed in section 26 of the' Constitution
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra,
at 271. See also §§ 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80.
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness
to those who wished to attend. Perhaps the best indication
of this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebee
which was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas
Cushing, Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and approved by the First Continental Congress on October 26,
1774. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789,
at 101, 105 (1904). This address, written to explain the
position of the colonies and to gain the support of the people
of Quebec, is an "exposition of the fundamental rights of the
colonists, as they were understood by a representative assembly chosen from all the colonies." 1 Schwartz, supra, a.t 221 ~
Because it was intended for the inhabitants of Quebec>who

:'-····

S

l

79-243-0PINION
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA

11

had been ueducated under another form of government" and
had only recently become English subjects, it was thought
desirable for the Continental Congress to explain "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government, which it is the privilege of all English subjects to
enjoy." 1 Journals 106.
" [One] great right is that of trial by jury. This provides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken
from the possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable
countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who from that
neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of the
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face,
in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to
attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against
him..• ." 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added).

I

B
As we have shown, and as was shown in both the Court's
opinion and the dissent in Gannett, supra, at 384, 386, n. 15;
418-425, the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively
that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, crimin,al trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long
been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an AngloAmerican trial. Both Hale in the 17th century and Blackstone in the 18th saw the importance of openness to the
proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it
discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. See, e. g., M. Hale,
The History of the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th
ed. 1820); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373. Jeremy
Bentham not only recognized the therapeutic value of open \
justice but regarded it as the keystone :
"Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient : in
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comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small
account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institu..
tions might present themselves in the character of checks,
would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks;
as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." 1 J.
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidences 524 (1827),7
Panegyrics on the values of openness were by no means confined to self-praise by the English. Foreign observers of
English criminal procedure in the 18th and early 19th centuries came away impressed by the very fact that they had
been freely admitted to the courts, as ma.ny were not in their \
own homelands. See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English
Criminal Law 715, and n. 96 (1948). They marveled that
"the whole juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P. J. Grosley, A Tour to London; or new Observations on England 142
(Nugent trans. 1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717,
and one commentator declared that :
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists
in publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the extraordinary despatch with which business is transacted. The
publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing. Free
access to the courts is universally granted." C. Goede,
A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans.
1822). (Emphasis added.)
The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of
fairness was not lost on them:
"[T] he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly
exposed to public animadversion ; and this greatly tends
to augment the extraordinary confidence, which the
English repose in the administration of justice." Goede,
supra, at 215.
T Bentham also emphasiz,ed that open proceedings enhanced the performance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public. !d., at 522-525.

..
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This observation raises the important point that "[t]he \
publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of much
broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of testimony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1834, at p. 435 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976) .8 The early history of open trials in part reflects
the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even without such experts to
frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience
and observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the
I!Upport derived from public acceptance of both the process
and its results. When a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. See H.
Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131 (1956). Thereafter
the open processes of justice serve a prophylactic purpose,
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to
criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of
outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they
did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on
our frontiers. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal,
as much perhaps as the execution of punishment, operate[]
to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or
public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of security, and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to punish.' "
Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961).
e A collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility that someone
in attendance at the trial or who learns of the proceedings through publicity may be able to furnish evidence in chief or contradict "falsifiers."
6 Wigmore, supra, at 436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences.
Id., at 436, and n. 2.
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Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the
vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural
yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution.
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of
justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis
can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert
manner." Supra, at-. It is not enough to say that results
alone will satiate the natural community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from
public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that
the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.
To work effectively, society's criminal process "must satisfy
the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S.
11, 14 (1954), and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it.
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting" form of trial became too cumbersome, ~ members
of the community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but
the community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of trials. The people retained a "right of visitation" \
which enabled them to satisfy themselves that justice was in
fact being done.
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial
is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity
both for understanding the system in general and its workings
in a particular case:
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material
advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and
intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies
is secured which could never be inspired by a system of

1-w \'J
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secrecy.'' 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438.
tham, supra, at 525.

See also 1

115
Ben~

In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance
at court was a common mode of "passing the time.'' See,
e. g., 6 Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6. With
the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the
representations or reality of the real life drama once available
only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a
widespread pastime. Yet " [ i] t is not unrealistic even in this
day to believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of
legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair
administration of justice." State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78,
87- 88, 139 N. W. 2d 800, 807 (1966). Instead of acquiring
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it
chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense,
this validates the media claim ~unctioning as surrogates for
the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right
of access as the public, they often are provided special seating
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in
attendance have seen and heard. This "contribute[s] to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension
of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system .... "
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring).

c

From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to
conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. This
conclusion is hardly novel; without a direct holding on the
issue, the Court has voiced its recognition of it in a variety
of contexts over the years. 9 Even while holding, in Levine v.
a " Of course trials must be public and the public have a deep interest

of
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United States, 362 U.S. 611 (1960), that a criminal contempt
proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved:
"[W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment only for 'criminal prosecutions,' that provision is a reflection of the notion, deeply
in trials." Pennekamp v. FlMida, 328 U. S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
"The triul is a public event. What tmnspires in the court room is public
property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.).
"[W Je have been unable to find a ~ingle instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any fcdeml, state, or municipal court during the
history of this country. Nor htwe we found any record of even one such
secret rriminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of St;u Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in
di~pute. . . . This nation's areepted practice of guanmtecing a public
trial to an accused has it~ root~ in our English common law heritage.
The exrlct date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before
the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution
of jury trial." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (footnotes omitted).
"One of the demands of a democratic society is tha.t the public should
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens
there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs
in its courts, . . . reporters of all media, including television, are always
present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs
in open court . . . . " Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965)
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C. J., concurring). (The
Court ruled, however, that the televising of the criminal trial over the
defendant's objections violated his due process right to a fair trial.)
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has
long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.'"
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.) .

...
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rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.' . . . [D]ue process demands appropriate rega.rd for the requirements of a public proceeding in cases of criminal contempt . . . as it does
for all adjudications through the exercise of the judicial power, barring narrowly limited categories of exceptions .... " !d. , at 616 (citations omitted). 10
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368
(1979), both the majority, 443 U. S., at 384, 386, n. 15, and
dissenting opinions, 443 U. S., at 423, agreed that open trials
were pa.r t of the common law tradition.
Despite the history of criminal trials being presumptively
open since long before the Constitution, the State presses its
contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone,
this is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials.
[

III
A
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth,
prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. " These rxpressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communica.tion on
matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly
it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of
10

The Court went on to hold that, "on the particular circumstances
of the ca;;r," :362 F . S., al 616, I he f\rcw-wd could not complain on appeal
of lhe "~ o-rnlled '::;ern·cy' of the prorPeding:::," id., at 617, herau~P, with
counsrl pre,ent, he had failed to object or to reque::;t the judge to open
the courtroom at t he time.

1
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higher concern and importance to the people than the manner
in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown,
recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history of open
trials and the opinions of this Court. Supra, at - , and n.

1.

.' .

The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the
long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access
to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the
process itself; the conduct of trials "before as many of the
]Wople as chuse to a.ttend" was regarded as one of "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government.''
Journals of the Continental Congress. supra, at
106, 107. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech
and press, the Fir·st Amendme11t can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees. "[T] he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock
of information from which members of the public may draw."
F·irst Kational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765. 783
(1978). Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen.
"In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to 'receive information and idea.s.' "
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762 ( 1972). What this
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,., prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had
long been open to the public at the time that amendment was
a.dopted. "For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a libertyloving society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252, 263 (1941).
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations
concerning them as a "right of acces~,'' cf. Gannett, supra, at
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397 (PowELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U. S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817
(1974), 11 or a "right to gather information," for we have recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a
tria.I would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial
could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily/~

B
The right of access to places traditionally open to the public, including criminal trials, may be seen as assured by the
amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press; and their a.ffinity to the right of assembly is not without relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst
to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen.18
11 Prownier and Saxbe, supm, are distinguishable in the sense that
'they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not
"open" or public places. Penal institutions do not share the long tradi·
tion of openness, although traditionally there have been visiting committees of citizens, and there is no doubt that legislative committees could
exercise plenary oversight and "visitation rights." Saxbe, supra, at 849,
noted that "limitation on visitations is justified by what the Court of
Appeals acknowledged as 'the truism that prisons are institutions where
public access is generally limited.' . . . 494 F. 2d, at 999. See Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) [jails] .'' See also Greer v. Spack, 424
U. S. 828 (1976) (military bases) .
12 That the right to attend may be exercised by people Jess frequently
today when information as to trials generally reaches them by way ot
print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right . Instead of
relying on personal observation or reports from neighbors as in the past,
most people receive information concerning trials through the media whose
representatives "are entitled to the same rights [to attend trials] as the
general public." Estes v. Texas, supra, at 540.
1 3 When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was contended that there was no need separately to assert the right of assembl)'
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"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental."
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but
also to listen, observe, and learn; indeed, they may "assembl[e] for any lawful purpose," Hayue v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496,
519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). More recently we characterized the right to assemble as "the right of the people to
gather in public places for social or political purposes."
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615 (1971). In
this same vein, in Hague v. C. I . 0 ., s'upra, Mr. Justice Roberts
reminded that:
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citibecause it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that inclusion of "assembly" among the enumerated rights
would tend to make the Congress
"appear triflng in the eyes of their constituents. . . . If people freely
converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident,
unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that
never would be called in question ... ." 1 Annals of Congress 731 (1789).
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, Sedgwick
went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people by listing them, "they might have
gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights," but this was unnecessary,
he said, "in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed ." 1 Annals of Congress 732.
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times "such rights
have been opposed," and that "people have . . . been prevented from
assembling together on their lawful occasions":
"[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by
inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people could
be deprived of the power of assembly under any pretext whatsoever, they
lnight be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause." Ibid.
The motion to strike "as:;embly" was defeated. ld., at 733.
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zens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens." !d., at 515. See also, e. g., Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969) .
Public streets, sidewalks, and pa.rks are areas where First
Amendment rights of speech and assembly are traditionally
exercised; a trial courtroom also is a public place where the
people generally-and representatives of the media-have a
right to be present, and where their presence historically has
been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what
takes place.14

c

The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out
a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and
that accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility
that such a contention could be made did not escape the notice
of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that
some important rights might be thought disparaged because·
It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill of Rights
was in large part drafted in reaction to restrictions on such rights in Eng~
land . See, e. g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, ch. 8.
As we have shown, the right of Englishmen to attend trials was not
similarly limited; but it would be ironic indeed if the very historic openness of the trial could militate against protection of the right to attend
it. The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from those
abuses which led the Framers to single out particular rights. The very
purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee all facets of each right
described ; its draftsmen sought both to protect the " rights of Englishmen" and to enlarge their scope. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252, 263-265 (1941).
"There are no contrary implications in any part of the history of the period
in which the First Amendment was framed and adopted. No purpose in
ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people
of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed." !d.,
at 265.
14

,,
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not specifically guaranteed. It was even argued that becau~
.of this danger no Bill of Rights should be adopted. See, e. g.,
A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84. In a letter to Thomas
Jefferson in October of 1788, James Madison explained why
he, although "in favor of a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in
a.n important light" up to that time: "I conceive that in a certain degree ... the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted." He went on to
state "there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration
of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in
the requisite latitude." 5 Writings of James Madison 271
(Hunt ed. 1904). 1 5
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded
recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the
Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in
enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent and the
right to be .i udged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear
nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these
important but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been
found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees. 16 The concerns expressed by Madison and
15 Madison's comments in Congress also reveal the perceived need for
some sort of constitutional "saving clause," which, among other things,
would serve to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim ·
that the affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not
expressly defined. See 1 Annals of Congress 438-440 ( 1789) . See also,
e. g., 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
651 (5th ed. 1891) . Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others.
16 See, e. (!., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right. of association); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v.
~eorgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy); Estelle v. Williams,~ •
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others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even
though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the
Court as indispensable to the enjoymeut of rights explicitly
defined.
We hold tha.t the right to attend criminal trials 17 is implicit
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the free ..
dom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for cen•
turies, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the
press could be eviscerated." Branzburg, rsupra, at 681.

D
Having concluded there was a guaranteed right of the public under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to attend
the trial of Stevenson's case, we return to the closure order
challenged by appellants. The Court in Gannett, supra, made
clear that although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a. right to a public trial, it does not give a right to a
private trial. 443 U. S., at 382. Despite the fact that this
was the fourth trial of the accused and that none of the prior
trials had been closed, the trial judge made no findings to
support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alternative solutions would ha.ve met the need to ensure fairness;
there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution
for the public or press to attend the trial. In contrast to the
pretrial proceeding dealt with in Gannett, supra, there exist
in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness. See, e. g.,
Nebraska Pres8 Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 563-56S;
U. S. 501, 503 ( 1976), and Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 483-486
(1978) (presumption of innocence); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)
(standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Guest,
383 U. S. 745, 757-759 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel) .
17
Whr>ther the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil
Jmd criminal trials have been presumptively open.

•.
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Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S., at 357-362. There was nd
suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have
been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their
sequestration during the trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U. S., at 359. Nor is there anything to indica.te that sequestration of the jurors would not have guarded against their
being subjected to any improper information. All of the
alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but
none of the factors relied on here were beyond the realm of
the manageable. Absent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public.18 Accordingly, the judgment under review is reversed.
Reversed.

MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
18

We have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or
parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, cf., e. g., 6 J. Wig·
more, Evidence § 1835 (Chadbourn rev. 1876), but our holding today does
not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and representa·
tives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reason·
able time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the
interest of such objectives as the free flow of tra.ffic, see, e. g., Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941), so may a trial judge, in the interest of
the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access
to a trial. " [T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge .. . the opportunities
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemoria.!ly associated with resort to public places." ld., at 574. It is
far more important that trials be conducted in a quiet and orderly setting
than it is to preserve that atmosphere on city streets. Compare, e. g.,
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 17 (1949), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S.
337 (1970), and Estes v. 'l'exas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965). Moreover, since
courtrooms have limited capacity, there may be occasions when not every
person who wishes to attend can be accommodated. In such situations,
reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionally imposed, including preferential seating for media representatives. Cf. Gannett, supra, at
397-398 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Houchins v. KQED, Inc , 438 U. S.
1. 17 (1978) (STEWART, J ., concurring) ; id., at 32 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting) .
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If it turns out that there is no possibility
of a Court opinion in this case, I shall change the
last paragraph so as to join only the judgment.
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta Iolanthe, the Lord Chancellor
recites:
"The Law is the true embodiment
of everything that's excellent,
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my lords, embody the law."
It is difficult not to derive more than a little of this flavor from
both the .opinion of the Chief Justice and the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan in this case.

The opinion of the Chief Justice

states that:
"[H]ere for the first time the Court is asked to
decide whether a criminal trial itself may be
closed to the public upon the unopposed request
of a defendant, without any demonstration that
closure is required to protect the defendant's
superior right to a fair trial, or that some
other overriding consideration requires
closure." Ante, at 7.
The · concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan states that

- ..

- 2 -

"[R]ead with care and in context, our decisions
must therefore be understood as holding only that
a ny privil e ge of a ccess to gove r nmental
information is subject to a degree of restraint
dictated by the nature of the information and
countervailing interests in security or
confidentiality." Ante, at 2-3.
For the reasons stated in my separate concurrence in Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443

u.s.

368, 403 (1979), I do not believe

that either the First or Sixth Amendments, as made applicable to the
states by the Fourt ee nth, require that a State's reasons for denying
public access to a trial, where both the prosecuting attorney and
the defendant have consented to an order of closure approved by the
judge, are subj e ct to any additional constitutional review at our
hands.

And I most certainly do not believe that the Ninth Amendment

confers upon us any such power to review orders of state trial
judges closing trials in such situations.

See Ante at 22 n. 15.

We have at present fifty state judicial systems and one federal
judicial system in the United States, and our authority to reverse a
decision by the highest court of the state is limited to only those
occasions when the state decision violates some provision of the
United States Constitution.

And that authority should be exercised

with a full sense that the judges whose decisions we review are
making the same effort as we to uphold the Constitution.

As said by

Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in Brown v. Allen, 344

u.s.

443, 540 "we are not final because we are infallible, but we

are infallible only because we are final."
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound to
be a matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens.

But to

gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past generation,
all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over how justice shall be
administered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the
fifty states, is a task that no Court consisting cYf nine persons,
- · _· [lowever gifted, is

e~uaJ__to.

Nor is it de sir able that"". such

authority be exercised .oy· -such a tiny-·nuinerical fragment of the 220

-

3 -

million people who compose the population of this country.

In the

same concurrence just quoted, Mr. Justice Jackson accurately
observed that "[t]he generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so
indeterminate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court
has found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify
federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the states."

Id.

at 534.
However high minded the impulses which originally spawned this
trend may have been, and which impulses have been accentuated since
the time Justice Jackson wrote, it is basically unhealthy to have so
much authority concentrated in a small group of lawyers who have
been appointed to the Supreme Court and enjoy virtual life tenure.
Nothing in the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch)

137

(1803) requires that this Court

through ever broadening use of the Supremacy Clause smothe r a
healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national
government embracing fifty states.
The issue here is not whether the "right" to freedom of the
press conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution overrides
the defendant's "right" to a fair trial conferred by other
amendments to the Constitution; it is instead whether any provision
in the Constitution may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial
judge in the Virginia state court system did in this case.

Being

unable to find any such prohibition in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or
any other Amendments to the United States Constitution, or in the
Constitution itself, I dissent.
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Memorandum to the Conference:
I have today sent to the Printer the following changes in
my June 11 draft:
The question presented on page one should read:
"The narrow question presented in this case is whether
the right of the public and press to attend criminal
trials is guaranteed under the United States
Constitution."
The first full paragraph on page six should read:
"Since the Virginia Supreme Court declined plenary
review, it is reasonably foreseeable that other trials
may be closed by other judges without any more showing
of need than is presented on this record.
More often
than not, criminal trials will be of sufficiently
short duration that a closure order 'will evade
review, or at least considered plenary review in this
Court.'
Nebraska Press, supra, at 547.
Accordingly,
we turn to the merits."
Also on page six, the first paragraph of Part II should
read:
- "We begin consideration of this case by noting
that the precise issue presented here has not
previously been before this Court for decision.
In
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979),
the Court was not required to decide whether a right
of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on
~trial motions, was constitutionally guaranteed.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
the accused of a public trial gave neither the public
nor the press an enforceable right of access to a
pretrial suppression hearing.
One concurring opinion
specifically emphasized that 'a hearing on a motion
before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial .... '
443 u.s., at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Moreover, the Court did not decide whether the First
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right of the
public to attend trials, id., at 392 and n. 24: nor
did the dissenting opinion-reach this issue.
Id., at
447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)."
--

- 2 -

On page seven, the first paragraph ' of Part II A should read:
"The origins of the proceeding which has become the
modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be
traced back beyond reliable historical records. We
need not here review all details of its development,
but a summary of that history is instructive. What is
significant for present purposes is that throughout
its evolution, the trial has been open to all who
cared to observe."
On page thirteen, the sentence following the citation to
Weihofen should read:
"Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet
for community concern, hostility, and emotion."
On page fourteen, the last sentence of the first paragraph
should read:
"To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process 'satisf[ies] the appearance of
justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 u.s. 11, 14
(1954), and the appearance of fustice can best be
provided by allowing people to observe it."
On page nineteen, the first sentence of Part III B should
read:
"The right of access to places traditionally open
to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may
be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press; and their
affinity to the right of assembly is not without
relevance."
On pages twenty and twenty-one, the text from the sentence
beginning "More recently we characterized .•.. " up to the end of
Part III B should be deleted, and the following substituted in
its place:
"Subject to the traditional time, place, and manner
restrictions, see, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
u.s. 569 (1941); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 560-564 (1965), streets, sidewalks, and parks are
places traditionally open, where First Amendment
rights may be exercised, see Hague v. C.I.O., 307 u.s.
496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); a trial
courtroom also is a public place where the people
generally--and representatives of the media--have a
right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity
and quality of what takes place.l4n

...

-3And on page twenty-three, the third sentence of Part III D
should read:
"Despite the fact that this was the fourth trial of
the accused, the trial judge made no findings to
support closure: no inquiry was made as to whether
alternative solutions would have met the need to
ensure fairness; there was no recognition of any right
under the Constitution for the public or press to
attend the trial."
I will circulate
available.

another print d draft as soon as it is

P.S.
It is most unfortunate that, although seven of us are
of one mind on the essentials of this case--the openness of
criminal trials--we fail, apparently, to clarify the confusion
that followed in the wake of Gannett. We are under the same
"Term end" pressures that accompanied Gannett, but I think we
fall short if the present lack of a "Court" prevails.
I have
yet to see a writing, other than Bill ehnquist's, which is so
at ~the assi ned opinion that the author of t~at
se arate wr 1n could not a
n ' e as 1
opinion.
If
di erences do exist, an a
p s
e made to
cownunicate them and to work them out--as some have done. An
unnecessarily''fractionated Court~serves no good purpose; it
causes those reading our opinions to find differences of
substance which are not actually there.
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Mr.
Mr.
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Mr.
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Mr.
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From: Mr. Justice Blackmun
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No. 79-243 - Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

a

My opinion and vote in partial dissent last Term in Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406

~

(1979), compels my vote to

reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of

Virg~

'

I

The Court's opinion and decision in this case are gratifying
for me for two reasons:
It is gratifying, first, to see the Court now looking to and
relying

upon

legal

history

in

determining

public character of the criminal trial.
and n.9.

the

fundamental

Ante, at 7-11, 15-17,

The partial dissent in Gannett, 443

u.s.,

at 419-433,

took great pains in assembling -- I believe adequately -- the
historical

...

material

and

in

stressing

its

importance

to

this

No. 79-243

- 2 area of the law.

See also MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's helpful review

set forth as Part II of his opinion in the present case • . Ante,
at 5-10.

Although the Court in Gannett gave a modicum of lip

service to legal history, 443 U.S., at 386, n.l5, it denied its
obvious application when the defense and the prosecution, with
no

resistance

by

the

trial

judge,

agreed

that

the

'·

proceeding

should be closed.
The

Court's

return

to

history

is

a

welcome

change

in

direction.
It

is

gratifying,

second,

to

see

the Court wash away at

least some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions
in Gannett.
that case,
clear

No

less

the Court

dicta)

observed

than 12 times

in the primary opinion in

(albeit in what seems now to have become
that

applied to the trial itself.

its Sixth Amendment closure ruling
The author

of the first concur-

ring opinion was fully aware of this and would have restricted

-

the Court's observations and ruling to the suppression hearing.

,<
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443 U.S.,
id.,

at

at

394.

Nonetheless,

394,

with

its multiple

he

joined

references

the
to

Court's

opinion,

the trial itself;

the opinion was not a mere concurrence in the Court's judgment.
And
id o

MR.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST,

at

t

that

403,

quite

the Court was

"'members of
Sixth
quoting

and

the

among

his

understandably
holding

separate

concurring
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was
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The Court's ultimate ruling in Gannett, with such clarification as is provided by the opinions in this case today, apparently is now to the effect that there is no Sixth Amendment right on
the part of the public -- or the press -- to an open hearing on a
motion

Gannett

to

suppress.

was

in

I,

error,

of

both

course,

in

its

continue

to

believe . that

interpretation

of

the
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- 4 Sixth

Amendment

generally,

and

in

its

application

to

the

''

suppression hearing, for I remain convinced that the right to a
public trial is to be found where the Constitution explicitly
placed it

..

in the Sixth Arnendment.ll

The Court, however, has eschewed the Sixth Amendment route.
Instead,

it turns to other possible constitutional sources and

invokes a veri table potpourri of them -- the speech clause of
the First Amendment, the press clause, the assembly clause, the

...
Ninth Amendment,

and a cluster of penumbral guarantees recog-

nized in past decisions.

This course is troublesome, but it is

the route that has been selected and, at least for now, we must
live with it.
length

here

troublesome.
marks

the

closure

No purpose would be served by my spelling out at
the
I

reasons

for
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saying

that

the
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is

need do no more than observe that uncertainty

nature
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The Court's opinion speaks of

overriding interest articulated in findings,
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ante, at 24: MR.
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"reasonable

reserves,

limitations,"

perhaps

ante,

at

not
2;

inappropriately,

MR.

presents his separate analytical framework;

JUSTICE

BRENNAN

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

in Gannett was critical of those Justices who, relying on the
Sixth Amendment, concluded that closure is authorized only when
"strictly and inescapably necessary," 443 U.S., at 399-400; and
MR.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST continues

his

flat

rejection of,

among

others, the First Amendment avenue.
Having said all this, and with the Sixth Amendment set to
one side in this case, I am driven to conclude, as a secondary
position, that the First Amendment must provide some measure of
protection for public access to the trial.

The opinion in part-

ial dissent in Gannett explained that the public has an intense
need and a deserved right to know about the administration of
justice

in general;

particular;
defense

about

counsel,

about

the
police

the prosecution of

conduct
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officers,
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judge,

other

local crimes
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public
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Cohn,
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414,
420
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428-429,

u.s.

the

448.

469,

492

approach

the

Court has chosen to take, that, by closing this criminal trial,
the trial judge abridged these First Amendment interests of the
public.
I also would reverse, and I join the judgment of the Court.
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[June -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, the Court
held that the Sixt~ Amendment, which guarantees "the accused" the right to a public trial, does not confer upon representatives of the press or members of the general public
any right of access to a trial. 1 But the Court explicitly left
open the question whether such a right of access may be
guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution, id., at
391-393. MR. JusTICE PowELL expressed the view that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do extend at least a limited right of access even to pretrial suppression hea.rings in
criminal cases, id., at 397-403 (concurring opinion). MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST expressed a contrary view, id., at 403-406
(concurring opinion). The remaining members of the Court
were silent on the question.
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with
respect to pretrial suppression hearings in criminal cases, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and
the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well
as criminal. 2 As has been abundantly demonstra.t ed in Pa.rt
1 The Court also made clear that the Sixth Amendment does not give
the accused the right to a private trial. 443 U. S., at 382. Compare
Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 (Sixth Amendment right of trial by
jury does not include right to be tried without. a jury.).
2 It has long been established that the protections of the First Amendment are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by

------
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II of the opinion of THE CHIEF J usTICE, in MR. JusTICE
BRENNAN's concurring opiriion, and in MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion last Term in the Gannett case, 443
U. 8., at 406, it has for centuries been a basic presupposition
of the Anglo-American legal system that trials shall be public
trials. The opinions referred to also convincingly explain the
many good reasons why this is so. With us, a trial is by very
definition a proceeding open to the press and to the public.
In conspicuous contrast to a milita.ry base, Greer v. Spock,
424 U. 8. 82~; a jail, Adderle11 v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39; or a
prison, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. 8. 817, a trial courtroom is a
public place. Even more than city streets, ·sidewalks, and
parks as a.reas of traditional First Amendment activity, e. g.,
Shuttleworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 174, a trial courtroom
is a place where representatives of the press and of the public
are not only free to be, but where their presence serves to
11ssure the integrity of what goes on.
But this does not mean that the First Amendment ·right
of members of the public and representatives of the press to
attend civil and criminal trials is absolute. · Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may
~ trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unre ..
stricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the
press and members of the pl,lblic. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U. 8. 333. Much more than a city street, a trial courtroom must be a quiet and orderly place. Compare Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U. 8. 77 with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. 8. 337
and Estes v. Texas, 381 U. 8. 532. Moreover, every courtroom has a finite physical capacity, and there may be occathe States. E.g , Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652. The First Amendment provisions relevant to this case are those protecting free speech and
a free press. The right to ~;-peak implies a freedom to listen, Kleindiemt
v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753. The right to publish implies a freedom to
gather information, Branzburg v. Hayu, 408· U. S. 665, 681. See concurring opinion of Mil. Ju s 'J'ICE BRENNAN, ante, at-, passim.

'
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eions when not all who wish to attend a trial may do so. 3
And while there exist many alternative ways to satisfy the
constitutional demands of a fair tria}/ those demands may
also sometimes justify limitations upon the unrestricted presence of spectators in the courtroom. 5
Since in the present case the trial judge appears to hav~
given no reCQgnition to the right of representatives of the
press and members of the public to be present at the Virginia
murder trial over which he was presiding, the judgment under
review must be reversed.
It is upon the basis of these principles that I concur in the
judgment.

In such situations, representatives of the press must he assured access.
v. KQED, Inc., 348 U. S. 1, 16 (concurring opinion).
4 Such alternatives include sesquestration of juries, continuances, and
changes of venue.
5 This is not to say that only constitutional considerations can justify
such restrictions. The preservation of trade secrets, for example, might
justify the exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil
trial. And the sensibilities of a. youthful prosecution witness, for examlJle, might ju~;tify similar exclusion in a criminal trial for rape, so long as
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial were not impaired.
See, e. g., Stamicarbon, N. V. v. American Cyanamid Company, 506 F. 2d
532, 539-542 .
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MR. JusTICE STEYENS, concurring.
This is a watershed case~An additional word of emph~
sis is therefore appropriate.
Twice before the~ implied that a.ny governmental
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe
and no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally ac ..
ceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special
disabilities not applicable to the public at large. In a dissent
joined by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
ip/'&rbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 850, MR.
v/.IusTICE PowELL unequivocaJly rejected the conClusion "that
' any governmental restriction on press access to information,
so long as it is not discriminatory, falls outside the purview
of First Amendment concern." I d., at 857 (emphasis ·in
original). And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. I, 1940, I explained at length why MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, MR.
JusTICE PowELL, and I were convinced that "[a]n official
prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the ·public
by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at· its source
I
i

'

Until to~ay the Court ~as accorded virtually absolute
protection to the dissemination of informat~on or ideas, hut
never before has it square1y ~eld that t~e acquisition of
newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protP.ction
whatsoe~er.
An additional word of epphasis ;~therefore
appropr1ate.

.

'

I
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abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by.
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.",
I,d., at 38. Since MR. JusTJCE MARSHALL and MR. JusTICE
BLACK1fUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority
of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or
the contrary conclusion expr~ssed in. the prevailing opinions.,....____
Today, ho,vever, for the first time, the Court unequivocally
holds that an arbitrary interference \\ith access to important
information is an abridgment of&freedoms of speech and of the
press protected by the First Amendment.
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more
reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in
Houchins. For Houchins involved the plight of a segment
of society least able to protect itself, an attack on a long.
standing policy of concealment, and an absence of any legitimate justification for abridging public access to information
about how government operates. In this case we are pro ..
tecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the community, we are concerne~ with an almost unique exception
to an established tradition of openness in the conduct of criminal trials, and it is likely that the closure order was motivated by the judge's desire to protect the individual defendant
<:>____}rom the burden of a fourth criminal trial.
/ ~
In any event, ~'i'ii'i'n+iall:;\ for the ~easons sta.ted in Part II
of my Houchins opinion, 438 U. S., at 30-38, I agree that the
as well as those
J} ----...;~"Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment man- stated by The
Chief Justice
dates a right of access to government information or sources of information
today,
within the government's control." 438 U. S., a.t 15 (opinion of BuRGER,

c. J.).

.-:> /

· "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a
right of acc-ess to information generated or controlled by government . ..•
The Constitution does no tnore than assure the public and the press equal
·access once government has opened its doors." !d ., at 16 (STEWART, J.,
ooncurring).
Neither that likely motivation nor facts showing the risk that a fifth
trial would have been necessary without closure of the fourth are dit;close<:l"
~n this record, however.

:!J----''--'
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The absence of any articulate~ reason for the closure order
is a sufficient basis for distinguishing this case from
Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368. The ~ecision to~ay is
in no way inconsistent with the perfectlv unambiguous
holding in Gannett that the rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment are rights that may be asserted by the accused
rather than members of the general public.
In my opinion
the Framers quite properly identified the party who has the
greatest interest in the right to a pubJic trial . The
language of the Sixth Amendment is worth emphasizing :
"In aJl criminal prosecutions, the accused sha 1 l
enjoy the right to a speedy and publ~trial , by an
impartiaJ jury of the State an0 district wherein the
crime shall have been committed , which district sha 1 1
have been previously ascertained ~y law, and to he
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witness against him ; to have
compulsory process for obtain5ng witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of rounse1 for his
defence ." U.S. r::onst. Am~t . VI.
(Emphasis a~r'le~ .)
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First Amendment protects the public and the press from
abridgment of their rights of access to information about the
operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch ;
given the total absence of any record justification for the
closure order entered in this case, that order violated th~
First Amendment.
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ftich:monrt Newspapers, Inc., et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeal from the Su~
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Cammgnwealth of Virginia et al.
[June - , 1980]
announced the judgment of the Court
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGERl

llllland delivered an

'

•

.

•,

h.

opinion in whlch Hr. Justlce W lte
and Mr. Justice Stevens joined.
The narrow question presented in this case is whether the
right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States Constitution.

I
In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the murder of a hotel manager who had been found stabbed to
death on December 2, 1975. Tried promptly in July 1976,
Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder in the
Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the conviction in October 1977, holding that a
bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had
been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S. E. 2d 779 (1977).
Stevenson was retried in the same court. This second trial
·ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978 when a juror asked to be
·excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available. 1
• 1 A newspaper account published the next day reported the mistrial and
went on to note that "[a] key piece of evidence in Stevenson's original
conviction was a bloodstained shirt obtained from Stevenson's wife soon
after the killing. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, ruled that the
shirt was entered into evidence improperly." App., at 34a.

''.
.<
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'A third trial, which began in the same court on June 6,
1978, also ended in a mistrial. It appears that the mistrial
may have been declared because a prospective juror had read
about Stevenson's previous trials in a newspaper and had told
other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial
began, See App., at 35a-36a.
S,tevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time
t beginning on September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom
when the ease was called were appellants Whe~ler and
1\:t;cCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that
it be closed to the public:
"[T]here was this woman that was with the family of the
deceased when we were here before. She had sat in the
Courtroom. I would like to ask that everybody be ex·
eluded from the Courtroom because I don't want any
information being shuffled back and forth when we have
'r
a .recess as to what-who testified to what." Trans. of
' f
Se.J?t. ,11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close
Td&l to the Public, 2-3.
The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three
previous trials, asked if the prosecution had any objection
to clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no
objection and would leave it to the discretion of the court.
Id., at 4. Presumably referring to Virginia Code § 19.2-266,
the trial judge then announced: "[T]he statute gives me that
power specificially and the defendant has made the motion.''
He then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all
parties except the witnesses when they testify." Id., at 4-5. 2
The record does not show that any objections to the closure
u

Virginia Code§ 19.2-266 provides in part:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemearlor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any
persobs whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated."
2

..•
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·order were made by anyone present at the time, includir~g
. appellants Wheeler and McCarthy.
·
Later that same day, however, appellants sought a hearing
·on a motion to vacate the closure order. The trial judge
'granted the request and scheduled a hearing to follow the
close of the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the
court ruled that the hearing was to be treated as part of the
trial; accordingly, he again ordered the reporters to leave
the courtroom, and they complied.
At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that
no evidentiary findings had been made by the court prior to
the entry of its closure order, and pointed out that the court
had failed to consider any other, less drastic measures within
its power to ensure a fair trial. Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978
Hearing on Motion to Vacate, 11-12. Counsel for appellants
argued that constitutional considerations mandated that before
ordering closure, the court should first decide that the rights
of the defendant could be protected in no other way.
Counsel for defendant Stevenson pointed out that this was
the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to
"difficulty with information between jurors," and stated that
he "didn't want information to leak out," be published by
the ,nedia, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the
jurors. Defense ·counsel argued that these things, plus the
fact that "this is a small community," made this a proper
case for closure. ld., at 16-18.
The trial judge noted that counsel for the defendant had
made similar statements at the morning hearing. The court
also stated:
"[O]ne of the other points that we take into consideration in this particular Courtroom is layout of the Courtroom. I think that having people in the Courtroom is
distracting to the jury. Now, we have to have certain
people in here and maybe that's not a very good reason.
When we get into our new Court Building, people can

?9-243-0FINION
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sit in the audience so the jury can't see them. The
rule of the Court may be different under those circumstances. . • ." I d., at 19.
The prosecutor again declined comment, and the court
I!Ummed up by saying:
"I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I
feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in any
way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and
it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else,
then I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's
motion." I d., at 20.
The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to
continue the following morning "with the press and public
excluded." ld., at 27; App., at 21a.
What transpired when the closed trial resumed the next
day was disclosed in the following manner by an order of
the court entered September 12, 1978:
"[I]n the absence of the jury, the defendant by counsel
made a Motion that a mis-trial be declared, which motion was taken tinder advisement. At the conclusion of
the Commonwealth's evidence, the attorney for the defendant moved the Court to strike the Commonwealth's
evidence on grounds stated to the record, which Motion
was sustained by the Court. And the jury having been
excused, the Court doth find the accused NOT GUILTY
of Murder, as charged in the Indictment, and he was
allowed to depart." App., at 22a.8
On September 27, 1978 the trial court granted appellants'
motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case.
· Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for
writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from
At oral argument, it was represented to the Court that tapes of the
trial were available to the public as soon as the trial terminated. Tr. d
.'Oral Arg., at 36.
8
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the trial court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia
Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition
petitions and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition
for appeal. App., at 23a-28a.
Appellants then sought review in this Court, invoking both
our appellate, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and certiorari jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). We postponed further consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing
of the case on the merits. U. S . - (1979). We conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie; 4 however,
treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition.
The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has
long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the
4

In our view, the validity of Virginia Code § 19.2-266 was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke
our appellate jurisdiction. "It is essential to our jurisdiction on
appeal . . . that there be an explicit and timely insistence in the state
courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellants never explicitly challenged the statute's validity. In both the trial court and the state
supreme court, appellants argued that constitutional rights of the public
and the press prevented the court from closing a trial without first
giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the public and the
press and exhausting every alternative means of protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Given appellants' failure explicitly to challenge
the statute, we view these arguments as constituting claims of rights
under the Constitution, which rights are said to limit the exercise of the
discretion conferred by the statute on the trial court. Cf. Phillips v.
United States, 312 U. S. 246, 252 (1941) ("[A]n attack on lawless
exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the authority.•..") . Such claims
are properly brought before this Court by way of our certiorari, rather
than appellate, jurisdiction. See, e. g., Kulka v. California Superior Court,
436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978); Hans(Jn v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, and
n. 4 (1958) . We shall, however, continue to refer to the parties as appellants and appellee. See Kulka, supra.
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case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, however, that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the
practical termination of a contest which is short-lived by
nature. See, e. g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S.
368, 377-378 (1979); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 546-547 (1976). If the underlying dispute is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 ( 1911), it is not moot.
Since the Virginia Supreme Court declined plenary review,
it is reasonably forseeable that other trials may be closed by
other judges without any more showing of need than is presented on this record. More often than not, criminal trials
will be of sufficiently short duration that a. closure order "will
evade review, or at least considered plenary review in this
Court." Nebraska Press, supra, at 547. Accordingly, we
turn to the merits.
II
We begin consideration of this case by noting that the precise issue presented here has not previously been before this
Court for decision. In Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979), the Court was not required to decide whether
a right of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on
pretrial motions, was constitutionally guaranteed. The Court
held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of
a public trial gave neither the public nor the press an enforceable right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing. One
concurring opinion specifically emphasized that "a hearing on
a motion before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial . ... "
443 U. S., at 394 (BuRGER, C. J., concurring). Moreover, the
Court did not decide whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee a right of the public to attend trials,
id., at 392, and n. 24: nor did the dissenting opinion reach this
issue. ld., at 447 (BLACKMUN , J., dissenting).
In prior cases the Court has treated questions involving con·
flicts between publicity and a defendant's right to a fair trial;
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as we observed in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S.
539, 547 (1976), "[t]he problems presented by this [conflict]
are almost as old as the Republic." See also, e. g., Gannett,
supra; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) . But here for the first time the Court is asked to
decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the
public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without
any demonstration that closure is required to protect the
defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other
overriding consideration requires closure.
A
The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern J
criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be traced back
beyond reliable historical records. We need not here review
all details of its development, but a summary of tha.t history
is instructive. What is significant for present purposes is that
throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who
ca.red to observe.
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England
were generally brought before moots, such as the local court
of the hundred or the county court, which were attended by
the freemen of the community. Pollock, English Law Before
the Norman Conquest, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History 89 (1907). Somewhat like modern jury duty,
attendance at these early meetings was compulsory on the
part of the freemen, who were called upon to render judgment.
1d., at 89-90; see also 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English
Law 10, 12 (1927), 5
6 That there is little in the way of a contemporary record from this
period is not surprising. It has been noted by historians, see E. Jenks,
A Short History of English Law 3-4 (2d ed. 1922), that the early AngloSaxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that
which every village elder knows? Only when a disputed point has long

.... •C..··.
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With the gradual evolution of the jury system in the years
after the Norman Conquest, see, e. g., 1 Holdsworth, supra, at
316, the duty of all freemen to attend trials to render judge
ment was relaxed, but there is no indication that criminal
trials did not remain public. When certain groups were
excused from compelled attendance, see The Statute of Marieborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 10; 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 79,
and n. 4, the statutory exemption did not prevent them from
attending; Lord Coke observed that those excused "are not
compellable to come, but left to their own liberty." 2 E.
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 121 (6th ed. 1681).6
Although there appear to be few contemporary statements
on the subject, reports of the Eyre of Kent, a general court
held in 1313-1314, evince a recognition of the importance
of public attendance apart from the "jury duty" aspect. It
was explained that:
"the King's will was that all evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better
accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the
county by their attendance there to lend him their aid in
the establishing of a happy and certain peace that should
be both for the honour of the realm and for their own
welfare." 1 Holdsworth, supra, at 268, quoting from the
S. S. edition of the Eyre of Kent, vol. i., p. 2 (emphasis
added).
caused bloodshed and disturbance, or when a successful invader . .. insists
·on a change, is it necessary to draw up a code." Ibid.
6 Coke interpreted certain language of an earlier chapter of the same
statute as specifically indicating that court proceedings were to be public
in nature : "These words [In curia Domini Regis] are of great importance,
for all Causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the
Judges of the King's Courts openly in the King's Courts, whither all per.sons may resort . ..." 2 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England lo:J.
(6th ed. 1681) (emphasis added).

·.
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From these early times, although great changes in courts
and procedure took place, one thing remained constant: the
public character of the trial a.t which guilt or innocence was
decided. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565 about "the
definitive proceedinges in causes criminall," explained that,
while the indictment was put in writing as in civil law
countries:
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
manie as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may
heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses
what is saide." T. Smith, De Republioo Anglorum 101
(Alston ed. 1972) (emphasis added).
Three centuries later, Sir Frederick Pollock was able to state
of the "rule of publicity" tha.t, "[h] ere we have one tradition,
at any rate, which has persisted through all changes." F. Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 31-32 (1904). See
~lso E. Jenks, The Book of English Law 73-74 (6th ed. 1967):
"[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice,
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the
public have free access, . . . appears to have been the rule in
England from time immemorial."
We have found nothing to suggest that the presumptive
openness of the trial, which English courts were later to call
"one of the essential qua.Iities of a court of justice," Daubney
v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K. B.
1829), was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of
colonial America. In Virginia, for example, such records as
there are of ea.rly criminal trials indicate that they were open,
and nothing to the contrary has been cited. See A. Scott,
Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 128-129 (1930); Reinsch,
'T he English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in
1 Selected Essa.ys in Anglo-American Legal History 405
(1907)
. Indeed, when in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assem.....
'
'

~:
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bly felt that the respect due the courts was "by the clamorous
unmannerlynes of the people lost, and order, gravity and
decoram which should manifest the authority of a court in
the court it selfe neglicted," the response was not to restrict
the openness of the trials to the public, but instead to prescribe rules for the conduct of those attending them. See
Scott, supra, at 132.
In some instances, the openness of trials was explicitly recognized as part of the fundamental law of the colony. The
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for
example, provided:
"That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes,
civil or criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the
said Province may freely come into, and attend the said
courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals
as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be
done in a corner nor in any covert manner." Reprinted
in Sources of Our Liberties 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959). See
also 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights : A Documentary
History 129 (1971) .
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also provided "[t]hat all courts shall be open .. . ," Sources of Our
Liberties, supra, at 217; 1 B. Schwartz, supra, at 140, and this
declaration was reaffirmed in section 26 of the Constitution
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776. See 1 B. Schwartz, supra,
at 271. See also §§ 12 and 76 of the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, 1641, reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 73, 80.
Other contemporary writings confirm the recognition that
part of the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness
to those who wished to attend. Perhaps the best indication
of this is found in an address to the inhabitants of Quebec
which was drafted by a committee consisting of Thomas
Cushing, Richard Henry Lee, and John Dickinson and approved by the First Continental Congress on October 26,
1774. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789,
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at 101, 105 (1904) . This address, written to explain the
position of the colonies and to gain the support of the people
of Quebec, is an "exposition of the fundamental rights of the
colonists, as they were understood by a representative assembly chosen from all the colonies." 1 Schwartz, supra, at 221.
Because it was intended for the inhabitants of Quebec, who
had been "educated under another form of government" and
had only recently become English subjects, it was thought
desirable for the Continental Congress to explain "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government, which it is the privilege of all English subjects to
~njoy. " 1 Journals 106.
"[One] great right is that of trial by jury. This provides, that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken
from the possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable
countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who from that
neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character, and the characters of the
witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full enquiry, face to face,
in open Court, before as many of the people as chuse to
attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against
him ...." 1 Journals 107 (emphasis added).
I

B
As we have shown, and as was shown in both the Court's
opinion and the dissent in Gannett, supra, at 384, 386, n. 15;
418-425, the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively
tha.t at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long
been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an AngloAmerican trial. Both Hale in the 17th century and Blackstone in the 18th saw the importance of openness to the
proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it

'19-243-0PINION
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discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and deci~
sions based on secret bias or partiality. See, e. g., M. Hale,
The History of the Common Law of England 343-345 (6th
ed. 1820); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372-373. Jeremy
Bentham not only recognized the therapeutic value of open
justice but regarded it as the keystone:
"Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small
account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of checks,
would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks;
as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." 1 J.
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidences 524 (1827) .7
Panegyrics on the values of openness were by no means confined to self-praise by the English. Foreign observers of
English criminal procedure in the 18th and early 19th cen~
turies came away impressed by the very fact that they had
been freely admitted to the courts, as many were not in their
own homelands. See L. Radzinowicz, A History of English
Criminal Law 715, and n. 96 (1948) . They marveled that
"the whole juridical procedure passes in public," 2 P. J. GrosIey, A Tour to London; or new Observations on England 142
(Nugent trans. 1772), quoted in Radzinowicz, supra, at 717,
and one commentator declared that:
"The main excellence of the English judicature consists
in publicity, in the free trial by jury, and in the extraor·
dinary despatch with which business is transacted. The
publicity of their proceedings is indeed astonishing. Free
access to the courts is universally granted." C. Goede,
A Foreigner's Opinion of England 214 (Horne trans.
1822). (Emphasis added.)
'Bentham also emphasized that open proceedings enhanced the performance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public. Id., at 522- 525.
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The nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of
fairness was not lost on them:
"[T]he judge, the counsel, and the jury, are constantly
exposed to public animadversion; and this greatly tends
to augment the extraordinary confidence, which the
English repose in the administration of justice." Goede,
Bupra, ·a t 215.
This observation raises the important point that "[t]he
publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of much
broader bearing than its mere effect on the quality of testimony." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1834, at p. 435 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976).8 The early history of open trials in part reflects
the widespread acknowledgement, long before there were
behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even without such experts to
frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience
and observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the
support derived from public acceptance of both the process
and its results.
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows. See H. Weihofen,
The Urge to Punish 130-131 (1956). Thereafter the open
processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose,
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to
criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of
outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they

I

I

s f\. collateral aspect seen by Wigmore was the possibility that someone
jn attendance at the trial or who learns of the proceedings through publicity may be able to furnish evidence in chief or contradict "falsifiers."
6 · Wigmore, supra, at 436. Wigmore gives examples of such occurrences.
ld., at 436, and n. 2.
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did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on
our frontiers. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal,
as much perhaps as the execution of punishment, operate[] ·
to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or
public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of security, and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to punish.' "
Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U: Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961).
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the
vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot
erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural
yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution.
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of
justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis
c.a n occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert
manner." Supra, a t -. It is not enough to say that results
alone will satiate the natural community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from
public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that
the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.
To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process "satisf[ies] the appearance of justice," Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) , and the appearance of
justice ca.n best be provided by allowing people to observe it.
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting" form of trial became too cumbersome, twelve members
of the community were delegated to act as its surrogates, but
the community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of trials. The people retained a "right of visitation"
which enabled them to satisfy themselves that justice was in
fact being done.
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial
is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity

l
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both for understanding the system in general and its workings
in a particular case:
"The educative effect of public attendance is a material
adva~tage. Not only is respect for the law increased and
~nteiligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of
government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies
is secured which could never be inspired by a system of
secrecy." 6 Wigmore, supra, at 438. See also 1 Bentham, supra, at 525.
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance
at court was a common mode of "passing the time." See,
e, g., 6 Wigmore, supra, at 436; Mueller, supra, at 6. With
the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the
representations or reality of the real life drama once available
only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a
wide~pread pastime. Yet "[i]t is not unrealistic even in this
day tq believe that public inclusion affords citizens a form of
legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair
administration of justice." State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78,
87- 88, 139 N. W. 2d 800, 807 (1966) . Instead of acquiring
information about trials by firsthand observation or by word
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it
c~i~fly through the print and electronic media. In a sense,
this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for
the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right
of access as the public, they often are provided special seating
and priority of entry so that they may report what people in
attendance have seen and heard. This "contribute[s] to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension
of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system ...."
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 587 (BRENNAN,
J ., concurring).

c

From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to
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conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice. This
conclusion is hardly novel; without a direct holding on the
issue, the Court has voiced its recognition of it in a variety
of contexts over the years. 0 Even while holding, in Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 611 (1960), that a criminal contempt
proceeding was not a "criminal prosecution" within the mean8 "Of course trials must be public and the public have a deep interest
in trials." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
"The trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public
property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.).
"[W]e have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the
history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such
secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in
dispute. . . . This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage.
The · exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before
the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution
of jury trial." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948) (Black, J.) (footnotes omitted).
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens
there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc .,
338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
"It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs
in its courts, . . . reporters of all media, including television, are always
present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs
in open court. . . ." Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541-542 (1965)
(Clark, J.); see also id., at 583-584 (Warren, C. J., concurring). (The
Court ruled, however, that the televising of the criminal trial over the
defendant's objections violated his due process right to a fair trial.)
"The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has
long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.' "
Sheppard v. Maxwell~ 384 U. S. 333, 349 (1966) (Clark, J.).

,(
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ing of the Sixth Amendment, the Court was careful to note
that more than the Sixth Amendment was involved:
" [W]hile the right to a 'public trial' is explicitly guaranteed by the Si~th Amendment only for 'criminal prosecutions,' that provision is a reflection of the notion, deeply
rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.' . . . [D]ue process demands appropriate regard for the requirements of a public proceeding in cases of criminal contempt . . . as it does
for all adjudications through the exercise of the judicial power, barring narrowly limited categories of exceptions . ..." !d., at 616 (citations omitted).10
And recently in Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 •U. S: 368
(1979), both the majority, 443 U. S., at 384, 386, n. 15, and
dissenting opinions, 443 U. S., at 423, agreed that open trials
were part of the common law tradition.
Despite the history of criminal trials being presumptively
open since long before the Constitution, the State presses its
contention that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
contains any provision which by its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials. Standing alone,
this is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection
against exclusion of the public from criminal trials.

III
A
The First Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth,
prohibits governments from "abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemThe Court went on to hold that, · "on the particular circumstances
of the case," 362 U. S., at 616, the a~used could not complain on appeal
of the "so-called 'secrecy' of the proceedings," id., at 617, because, with
counsel present, he had failed to object or to request the judge to open
the courtroom at the time.
10
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ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev~
~nces. " These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a corn~
mon core purpose of assuring freedom of cornmunica.tion on
matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly
it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of
higher concern and importance to the people than the manner
in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown,
recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history of o en
~s and the opinions of this Court. Supra, at
, and n.

\_!)

~'The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the
long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access
to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the
process itself; the conduct of trials "before as many of the
people as chuse to attend" was regarded as one of "the inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government." 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra, at
106, 107. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech
and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees. "[T]he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock
of information from which members of the public may draw."
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 783
(1978). Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen.
"In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.'"
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). What this
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment
guarantees of speech ancl press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had
long been open to the public at the time that amendment was
adopted. "For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest
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scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty·
loving society, will allow,'' Bridges v, California, 314 U. S.
252, 263 (1941),
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations
concerning them as a "right of access," cf. Gannett, supra, at
397 (PowELL, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U. S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817
(1974), 11 or a "right to gather information," for we have recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a
trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial
could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.12
:B
The right of access to places traditionally open to the pub- ~
lie, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by
the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
Procunier and Saxbe, supra, are distinguishable in the sense that
they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not
"open" or public places. Penal institutions do not share the long tradition of openness, although traditionally there have been visiting committees of citizens, and there is no doubt that legislative committees could
exercise plenary oversight and "visitation rights." Saxbe, supra, at 849,
noted that "limitation on visitations is justified by what the Court of
Appeals acknowledged as 'the truism that prisons are institutions where
public access is generally limited.' . . . 494 F . 2d, at 999. See Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 41 (1966) [jails] ." See also Greer v. Spock, 424
U. S. 828 (1976) (military bases) .
1
~ That the right to attend may be exercised by people less frequently
today when information as to trials generally reaches them by way of
print and electronic media in no way alters the basic right. Instead of
relying on personal observation or reports from neighbors as in the past,
most people receive information concerning trials through the media whose
representatives "are entitled to the same right:; [to attend trials] as the
general public." Estes v. Texas, supra, at 540.
11

·.
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press; and their affinity to the right of assembly is not without relevance. From the outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst
to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. 18
"The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamentaL'~
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but
also to listen, observe, and learn; indeed, they may "assembl[e] for any lawful purpose," Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496,
519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). Subject to the traditional
time, place, alld manner restrictions, see, e. g., Cox v. New·
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); see also Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 560-564 (1965), streets, sidewalks, and parks are
When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was contended that there was no need separately to assert the right of assembly
because it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued that inclusion of "assembly" among the enumerated rights·
would tend to make the Congress
"appear triflng in the eyes of their constituents. . . . If people freely
converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident,
unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that
never would be called in question ...." 1 Annals of Congress 731 (1789).
Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee, Sedgwick
went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people by listing them, "they might have
gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights," but this was unnecessary,
he said, "in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed ." 1 Annals of Congress 732.
Mr. Page of Virginia responded, however, that at times "such rights
have been opposed," and that "people have .. . been prevented from
assembling together on their lawful occasions" :
"[T]herefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by
inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. If the people could
be deprived of the power of assembly under any pretext whatsoever, they
might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause." Ibid.
·The motion to strike "assembly" was defeated. Id., at 733.
13
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places traditionally open , where First Amendment rights may ,
be exercised, see Hague v. C. I . 0., 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939)
( opiuion of Roberts, J.); a trial courtroom also is a public
place where the people generally-and representatives of the
media- have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has beeu thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.11

c

The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out
a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and
that accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility
that such a contention could be made did not escape the notice
of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that
some important rights might be thought disparaged because
not specifically guaranteed. It was even argued that because
of this danger no Bill of Rights should be adopted. See, e. g.,
A. Hamilton, The Federalist no. 84. In a letter to Thomas
Jefferson in October of 1788, James Madison explained why
he, although "in favor of a bill of rights," had "not viewed it in
14 It is of course true that the right of assembly in our Bill of Rights
was in large part draft.ed in reaction to restrictions on such rights in England. See, e. g., 1714, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5; cf. 1795, 36 Geo. 3, ch. 8.
As we have shown, the right of Englishmen to attend trials was not
similarly limited ; but it would be ironic indeed if the very historic openness of the trial could militate against protection of the right to attend
it. The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from those
abuses which led the Framers to single out particular rights. The very
purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee all facets of each right
described ; its draftsmen sought both to protect the "rights of Englishmen" and to enlarge their scope. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252, 263-265 (1941) .
"There are no contrary implications in any part of the history of the period
in which the First Amendment was framed and adopted. No purpose in
ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people
of the United States much greater freedom of religion , expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed." /d.,

at 265.

' J.
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an important light" up to that time: "I conceive that in a certain degree .. . the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted." He went on to
state "there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration
of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in
the requisite latitude." 5 Writings of James Madison 271
(Hunt ed. 1904) .15
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded
recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the
Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in
enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent and the
right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel, appear
nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these
jmportant but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been
found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees. 16 The concerns expressed by Madison and
~ Madison's comments in Congress also reveal the perceived need for
some sort of constitutional "saving clause," which, among other things,
would serve to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim
that the affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not
expressly defined . See 1 Annals of Congress 438-440 (1789). See also,
e. g., 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Const.itution of the United States
651 (5th ed. 1891) . Madison's efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment , served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others.
16
See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (right of association); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy) ; Estelle v. Williams, 425
U. S. 501, 503 (1976), and Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 483-486
(1978) (presumption of innocence); In re Winship , 397 U. S. 358 (1970)
(standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) ; United States v. Guest,
383 U. S. 745, 757-759 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
630 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
1

79-243- 0PINION
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v" VIRGINIA

23

,others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even
though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the
Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights ·explicitly
defined.
We hold that the right to attend criminal trials 17 is implicit
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the
press could be eviscerated." Branzburg, supra, at 681.

D
Having concluded there was a guaranteed right of the public under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to attend
the trial of Stevenson's case, we return to the closure order
challenged by appellants. The Court in Gannett, supra, made
clear that although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a right to a public tria.l, it does not give a right to a
private trial. 443 U.S., at 382. Despite the fact that this was
the fourth trial of the accused, the trial judge made no findings J
to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness;
there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution
for the public or press to attend the trial. In contrast to the
pretrial proceeding dealt with in Gannett, supra, there exist
in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness. See, e. g.,
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 563-565;
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S., at 357-362. There was no
suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have
been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their
sequestration during the trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U. S., at 359. Nor is there anything to indicate that seques17 Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civi1
and criminal trials have been presumptively open.

'.
I
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tration of the jurors would not have guarded against their
being subjected to any improper information. All of the
alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but
none of the factors relied on here were beyond the realm of
the manageable. Absent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public. 18 Accordingly, the judgment under review is reversed.
Reversed.

MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

18

We have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or
parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, cf., e. g., 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1835 (Chadbourn rev. 1876), but our holding today does
not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the
interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic, see, e. g., Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), so may a trial judge, in the interest of
the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access
to a trial. "[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities
for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places." !d., at 574. It is
far more important that trials be conducted in a quiet and orderly setting
than it is to preserve that atmosphere on city streets. Compare, e. g.,
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S.
337 (1970), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) . Moreover, since
courtrooms have limited capacity, there may be occasions when not every
person who wishrs to attend can be accommodated. In such situations,
reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionaUy imposed, including preferential seating for media representatives. Cf. Gannett, supra, at
397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring) ; Houchins v. KQED, Inc ., 438 U. S.
1. 17 (1978) (STEWART, J ., concurring) ; id., at 32 (STEVENs, J., dissenting).
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
\ joins, concurring in the judgment.
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) , held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to
the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press.
The instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its own force and as applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent
right of access to trial proceedings. Because I believe that the
First Amendment-of itself and as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment-secures such a public
right of a.ccess, I agree with t9e ~1 faliiy that, without more,
agreement of the trial judge and tlie parties cannot constitutionally close a trial to the public.1
Of course, the Sixth Amendment remains the source of the accused's
own right to insist upon public judicial proceedings. Gannett Co. v.
DePa8quale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979).
That the Sixth Amendment explicitly establishes a public trial right
does not impliedly foreclose the derivation of such a. right from other
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was not framed as a
work of carpentry, in which all joints must fit snugly without overlapping.
Of necessity, a document that designs a form of government will address
central political concerns from a variety of perspectives. Significantly,
this Court has recognized the open trial right both as a matter of the
Sixth Amendment and as an ingredient in Fifth' Amendment due process.
See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 614, 616 (1960); cf. In re
Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment due process).
1

•'
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While freedom of expression is made inviolate by the First
Amendment, and, with only rare and stringent exceptions, may
not be suppressed, see; e. g., Brown v. Glines,- U. S. - , (1979) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska Press Assn. v.
Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 558-559 (1976); id., at 590 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring in judgment); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam opinion); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-716 (1931), the First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative
freedom of access to information, see, e. g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,849 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1965); see also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1978) (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 16 (STEWART, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
supra, at 404-405 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). But cf. id.,
at 397-398 (PowELL, J., concurring); Houchins, supra, at 2738 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Saxbe, supra, at 856-864 (PowELL, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-842
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2 Yet the Court has not
ruled out a public access component to the First Amendment
in every circumstance. Read with care and in context, our
Analogously, racial segregation has been found independently offensive
to the Equal Protection and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954), with Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
~A conceptually separate, yet related, question is whether the media
should enioy greater access rights than the general public. See, e. g.,
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U.S. 843,850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U . S. 817, 834-835 (1974). But no such contention is at stake here.
Since the media's right of access is at least equal to that of the general
public, see ibid., this case is resolved by a decision that the state statute
unconstitutionally restricts public access to trials. As a practical matter,
however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary
of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens.,
and f~nnele information about trials to a large number of individuals .

.
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.decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that
any privilege of access to governmental information is subject
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality.
See Houchins, supra, at 8-9 (opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) (accese
to prisons); Saxbe, supra, at 849 (same); Pell, supra, at 831832 (same); Estes v. Texas , 381 U. S. ·532, 541- 542 (1965)
(television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17
(1965) (validation of passport to unfriendly country). These
cases neither comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public
access to information may at times be implied by the First
Amendment and the principles which animate it.
The Court's approach in right of access cases simply reflects
the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to
gather informa.tion. Customarily, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communication between speaker
and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free
speech protections are almost insurmountable. See Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. , a.t 558-559 (1976); New
York Times Co. v: United States, supra, 403 U.S., at714 (1971)
(per curiam opinion). See generally · Brennan, Address, 32
Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176 (1979). · But the First Amendment
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has · a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249- 250 (1936); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359,369 (1931); Brennan, supra, a.t-176177; Ely, Democra.cy and Distrust 93- 94 (1980); Emerson,
The Svstem of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1971). Implicit in this structural
role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues
shQuld be · u·ninhibited 1 robust 1 and wide-open ," New 'York
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), but the
antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic behavior-must be informed. 3 The structural
model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication.~
However, because "the stretch of this protection is theoretically endless," Brennan, supra, at 177, it must be invoked
with discrimina.tion and temperance. 'For so far as the participating citizen's need for information is concerned, "[t]here
3 This idea has been foreshadowed in MR. Jus•rrcE PowELL's dissent in
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974):
"What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment
in preserving free public ' discussion of governmental affairs. No aspect
of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to conider and resolve their own drstiny. . . . '[The] ... First Amendment
is one of the vit~l bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent selfgovernment.' . . . It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular
self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public
issues. And public debate must. not only be unfettered; it must also be
. informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First
Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as·
well as the right of free expression." (Footnote and citations omitted.)
4 The technique of deriving specific rights from the structure of our
constitutional government, or from other explicit rights, is not novel. The
right of suffrage has been inferred from the nature of "a free and democratic society" and from its importance as a "preservative of other basic
civil and political rights . . . ." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. ·533, '561-562'
(1964); San Antonio School Dist. v .'Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n.-74 (1973) ..
So, too, the explicit freedoms of speech, petition, and assembly have
yielded a correlative guarantee of certain associational activities. NAACP'
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) . See also Rodriguez, supra, at 33-34·
(indicating that rights may be implicitly embedded in the Constitution); id.,.
'at 62-63 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 112-115 (MARSHALL,'J., dissenting); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 · (.1965) (Bu.F..buJ:'AN, ·J., con~.rring).
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.ar-e few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow."
Zemel v. Rusk, supra, 381 U. S., at 16--17. An assertion of the
prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed
by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded.G
This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical necessities as it is of abstract reasoning. But at least
two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring
and vita.! tradition of public entree to particular proceedings
or information. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361-362
{1970). Such a tradition commands respect in part because
the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Second, the value of access must be
measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
statements tha.t all information bea.rs upon public issues; what
is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process.
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult
historical and current practice with respect to open trials,
and weigh the importance of public access to the trial process
itself.
II
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law
G Analogously, we have been somewhat cautions in applying First
Amendment protections to communication by way of nonverbal and nonpictorial conduct. Some behavior is so intimately connected with expression that for practical purposes it partakes of the same transcendental
constitutional value as pure speech. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969). Yet where the connection between expression and action is perceived as more tenuous, com.
municative interests may be overridden by competing social values. See,
e. g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 464-465 (1930),
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heritage." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948); see Gan-.
nett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S., at 419-420 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring a11d dissenting). Indeed, historically and
functionally, open trials have been closely associated with the
development of the fundamental procedure of trial by jury.
In re Oliver, b'Upra, at 266; Radin , The Right to a Public
Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932).n Pre-eminent English
legal observers and commentators have unreservedly acknowledged and applauded the public character of the common-law
trial process. See T. Smith. De Republica Anglorum 77, 8182 (1970); 7 2 E. Coke. Institutes of the Laws of England 103
(6th ed. 1681); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England *372- 373 ( 13th ed. 1800); 8 M. Hale, The History
of the Common Law of Engla.nd 342-344 (6th eel. 1820); 9 1
J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 584-585 (1827).
And it appears that "there is little record, if any, of secret proceedings, criminal or civil , having occurred at any time in
known English history." Gannett, supra, at 420 (BLACKMUN,
J., concurring and dissenting); see also In re Oliver, supra, at
269, n. 22; Radin , ~;-upra, at 386-387.
This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public
trials. See Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
6 "[The public trial] seems almost a necessary incident of jury trials,
since the presence of a jury . .. already insured the presence of a large
part of the public. We need scarcely be reminded that the jury was the
patria, the 'country' and that it was in that capacity and not as judges,
that it was summoned.'!. Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.
L. Q. 381, 388 (1932) ; see 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England *349 (13th ed. 1800) ("trial by jury; called also the trial per
pais, or by the country") ; T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1583) 79
(1970 ed.).
· 7 First published in 1583.
8 First published in 1765.
11 First edition published in 1713.
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l677, ch. XXIII; 10 Pennsylvania Frame of Government, 1682,
Laws Agreed Upon in England, V.11 "There is no evidence
that any colonial court conducted criminal trials behind closed
doors. . . ." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 425.
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring and dissenting).
Subsequently
framed state constitutions also prescribed open trial proceed~
ings. See, e. g., Pen11sylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776,
IX; 12 North Carolina Declara.tion of Rights, 1776, IX; ta
Vermont Declaration of Rights, X (1777); u see also I·n re
Oliver, supra, 333 P. S .. at 267. "Following the ratification
in 1791 of the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, ...
most of the origi11al states and those subsequently admitted to
the Union adopted similar constitutional provisions." /bid. 1 0
Today, the overwhelming majority of States securel!:: right
to public trials. Gannett, supra, at 414-415, n.£(BLACK~
MUN, J., concurring and dissenting); see also In re Oliver,
supra, at 267- 268, 271. and nn. 17- 20.
This Court too has persistently defended the public chara.c~
Quoted in 1 B, Schwartz, T he Bill of Rights: A Documentary History
129 (1971) .
11 !d., at, 140.
1 2 /cl ., a t 265.
13 /d., at 287.
14 !d., at 323.
10

15

To be sure , somr of thrse constitutions, such as the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, couched their public trial guarantees in the language
of the accused's rights. But although the Court has read the Federal
Constitution 's explicit public trial provision, U. S. Const. Amend. VI , as
benefiting the defendant alone, it does not follow that comparably worded
state guarantees must be so construed. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
s·upra, 44~ U . S., at -!25, and n. 9 (BLACKM,UK, .J.. concurring and di~ent
ing) ; cf. al~o Mal/ott\'. Ala.~J ka, - Ala.-, 11. 12 (1980). And even i'f
the ~ p rcific ~tatr· pttblil' trial prot ection" mu~t br ittvokrd L~· defrndnnts,
thosr ;.;tat e ron:stitutionnl clau:sc:-: :still provide evidr nce of thL· importance
attached to open trials by the founders of our state governments. Indeed,
it may have been thought that linking public trials to the accused's privileges was the most effective way of assuring a vigorous representative for ·
the popular interest .

3
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ter of the trial process. In re Oliver established that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids closed
criminal trials. Noting the "universal rule against secret
trials," 333 U. S., at 266, the Court held that
II [i] n VieW Of thiS nation'S historiC distrUSt Of SeCret prO,.
ceedi'ngs, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the
universal requirement of our federal and state govern ..
ments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law means at least that
an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison." Id., at
273. 16
Even more significantly for our present purpose, Oliver recognized that open trials are bulwarks of our free and democratio
government: public access to court proceedings is one uf the
numerous "checks and balances'' of our system, because- "con..
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," id., at
270. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966),
Indeed, the Court focused with particularity upon the· public
trial guarantee "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution," or "for the suppression of political and religious heresies." Oliver, supra, at 270.
Thus, Oliver acknowledged tha.t open trials are indispensable
to First Amendment political and religious freedoms.
By the same token, a special solicitude for the public character of judicial proceedings is evident in ·t he Court's"rulings
upholding the right to report about the administration of
justice. While these decisions are impelled by the classic protections afforded by the First Amendment to pure communi10 Notably, Oliver did not rest upon the simple incorporation of the
Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth, but upon notions intrinsic to due
process, because the criminal contempt proceedings at issue in the case
were "not within 'all criminal prosecutions' to which · [the Sixth] .. ,
Amendment applies." Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960);
see also n. 1, supra.

I
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, eation, they are also bottomed upon a keen appreciation of
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system
to public inspection. 17 So, in upholding a privilege for repor~
ing truthful information about judicial misconduct proceedings, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S.
829 ( 1978), emphasized that public scrutiny of the operation
of a judicial disciplinary body implica.tes a major purpose of
the First Amendment--"discussion of governmental affairs,"'
id., at 839. Again, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 427
U. S., at 559, noted that the traditional guarantee against
prior restraint "should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings. . . ." And Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), instructed that
" [ w] ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon
the administration of justice." See Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 473-474, 476-478 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (open judicial process is essential to fulfill "the First
Amendment guarantees to the people of this Nation that they
shall retain the necessary means of control over their
. t't
ms
1 ut'1ons. . . .") .
Tradition, contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's
own decisions manifest a common understanding that "[a]
trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
As a matter of law and virtually immemorial custom, public
trials have been the essentially unwavering rule in ancestral
England and in our own Nation. See In re Oliver, supra, 333
U. S., at 266-268; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 386, n. 15; id., at 418-432, and n. 11 (BLACKMUN, J., conIT As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his opinion for the Massachu ..
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394
(1884), "the privilege [to publish reports of judicial proceedings] and the
access of the public to the courts stand in reason upon common ·grounc:l:"
See .Lewis v. Levy, El., Bl., & El. 537 (1858).
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em-ring and dissenting). 18 Such abiding adherence to the
principle of open trials "reflect [s] a profound judgment about
the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155 (1968).

III
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open
trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our
judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e. g., Este8
v. Texas, 8Upra, 381 U. S., at 538-539 (1965). But, as a feature of our governing system of justice, the trial process serves
other, broadly political, interests, and public access advances
these objectives as well. To that extent, trial access possesses
specific structural significa.nce. 10

I

i!

I

1 8 The dirtum in Branzburg Y . Hayes. 40~ U.S. 665, 6R4-685 (1972), that
"[n]ewsmen .. . may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant
a fair trial . .. ," is not to the contrary; it simply notes that rights of
access may be curtailed where there are sufficiently powerful countervailing considerations. See ante, at 4.
10 By way of analogy, we have fashioned rules of criminal procedure w
serve intere~;ts implicated in the trial proress beside those of the defendant.
For example, the exclusionary rule is prompted not only by the accused's
interest in vindicating his own rights, but also in part by the independent
"'imperative of judicial integrity.'" See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S.
1, 12-13 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960) ~
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 357-359 (1974) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 484-485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; id., at 470 (Holmes, J ., dissenting). And several
Members of this Court have insisted that criminal entrapment cannot be"countenanced" because the "obligation" to avoid "enforcement of the·
law by lawless means ... goes beyond the convicticn of the particular
defendant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorableadministration of justire .. . is the transcending value at stake." Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurtin~ in result ; s~ United States v.. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,. 436-43} (1973)
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The trial is a means of meeting "the notion, deeply rooted
in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice.'" Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616
(1960), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14
(1954); accord, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U. S.,
at 429 (BLACKMl'N. J .. concurring and Jissenting); see Cowley
v. P·ulsifer, 137 Mass. 3n2. 394 (1884) (Holmes. J.). For a
civili:mtion foundrd upon pri11cipks of ordered liberty to sur~
vive and flourish, its members must share the conviction that
they are governed equitably. That necessity underlies cou~
stitutional provisious as diverse as the rule against takings
without just compensation. see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, U. S. --, - , and n. 7 (1980), and the Equal
Protection Clause. It also mandates a. system of justice that
demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens. One
major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protec~
tions and conducted with conspicuous respect for the rule of
law, is to make that demonstration. See In re Oliver, supra,
333 U. S., at 270, n. 24.
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials assure the public that
procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law. Public
access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve
the objective of maintaining public confidence in the aclministration of justice. See Gannett, supra, at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring am! dissenting).
But the trial is more than a demonstrably just method of
adjudicating disputes and protecting rights. It plays a. pivotal
role in the entire judicial process, and, by extension, in our
(Douglas, J ., dissenting) ; id .. at 442-443 (S1'EWA1t'f, J. , dist>enting);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 455 (1932) (opinion of Roberts,
J.) ; Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 423, 425 (1928) (Brandeiil, J.,
dis~Jenting).
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form of government. Under our system, judges are not mere
umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate
branch of govemrnent.20 While individual cases turn upon
the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vi~ally important task of construing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, SQ far as the
trial is the mechanism for judicial fa{)tfinding, as well 8.s the
initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine governmental proceeding.
It follows that the conduct of the trial is preeminently a
matter of public interest. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,
supra, 420 U. S., at 491-492; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari). More importantly, public
access to trials acts as an important check, akin in purpose to
the other checks and balances that infuse our system of. government. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is
an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," In re
Oliver, supra, at 270-an abuse that, in many cases, would
have ramifications beyond the impact upon the parties before
the court. Indeed, " ' [ w] ithout publicity, all other checks
2o The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law,
while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is subject to special
constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and confined
by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to be discerning, exercise judgment, and prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges
wield considerable authority to formulate legal policy in designated areas.
See, e. g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970) ; Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957) ; P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 45-46 (2d ed. 1974) ("Sherman Act [is] ... a general
authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques of judicial reasoning . . . and to develop, refine, .and
innovate in the dynamic common law· tradition.").

•'
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are insufficient : in comparison of publicity, aU other checks
sre of small account.'" Ibid., at '271, quoting 1 Bentham,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524; see 3 Bla.ckstone, Commentaries, *372; Hale, History of the Common Law 344; 1 J.
Bryce, The American Commonwealth 514 (1931).
Finally, with some limitations, a trial aims at true and
accurate factfinding. Of course, proper factfinding is to the
benefit of criminal defendants and of the parties in civil pro·
ceedings. But other, comparably urgent, interests are also
often at stake. A miscarriage of justice that imprisons a.n
innocent accused also leaves a guilty party at large, a continuing threat to society. Also, mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the plaintiff and
defendant. Facilitation of the trial factfinding process, therefore, is of concern to the public as well as to the parties. 21
Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding.
"Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown
to the parties." In re Oliver, supra, at 270, n. 24; see Tanksley
v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58, 59 (CA9 1944); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials in Common Laws§ 1834 (Chadbourn
rev. 1976). Shrewd legal observers have averred that
" open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing
up of truth, than the private and secret examination ...
where a witness may frequently depose that in private,
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn
tribunal."
3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *373; see Tanksley v. United
States, supra, at 59- 60; Hale, History of the Common Law,
345 ; 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 522-523.
And experience has borne out these assertions about the truthfinding role of publicity. See 2 Hearings before the Subcom2 1 Further, the interest in insuring that the innocent are not punished
may be shared by the general public, in addition to the accused himself.
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interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this pre-:
sumption of openness need not concern us now/ 4 for the statute at sta.ke here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered dis-.
cretion of the judge and parties. 25 Accordingly, Va. Cod~
19.2-266 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, anq
the ,decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to the contta~
!3hould ·be :reversed.

24

For example, national security concerus about confidentiality may
sometimes warrant closures during s('lnsitive tw.rtions of trial proceedings,
such as testimony about state secrets. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418
u. s. 683, 714-716 (1974) .
25 Significantly, l'lo~ing u trial lack:;; even the justification for barring the
door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of suppressible prejudicial evidence to the public before the jury pool ·has
become, in a practical sense, finite and subject to sequestration.
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MR. Jus'riCE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
My opinion and vote in partial dissent last Term in Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 406 (1979), compels
my vote to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Virginia.

. I

The decision 111 this case is gratifying for me for two
reasons:
It is gratifying, first, to see the Court now looking to and
relying upon legal history in determining the fundamental
public character of the criminal trial. Ante, at 7-11, 15-17,
and n. 9. The partial dissent in Gannett, 443 U. S., at 419433, took great pains in assembling-! believe adequatelythe historical material and in stressing its importance to this
area of the law. See also MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's helpful
review set forth as Part II of his opinion in the present case.
Ante, at 5- 10. Although the Court in Gannett gave a modicum of lip service to legal history, 443 U. S., at 386, n. 15, it
denied its obvious application when the defense and the prosecution, with no resistance by the trial judge, agreed that the
proceeding should be closed.
The Court's return to history is a welcome change in
direction.
It is gratifying, second, to see the Court wash away at least
some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions in

/~
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Gannett. No less than 12 times in the primary opinion in
that case, the Court (albeit in what seems now to have become clear dicta) observed that its Sixth Amendment closure
ruling applied to the trial itself. The author of the first concurring opinion was fully aware of this and would have restricted the Court's observations and ruling to the suppression hearing. 443 U. S., at 394. Nonetheless, he joined the
Court's opinion, id., at 394, with its multiple references to
the trial itself; the opinion was not a mere concurrence in the
Court's judgment. And Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST, in his separate concurring opinion, id., at 403, quite understandably
observed, as a consequence, that the Court was holding
"without qualification." ·ibid., that "'members of the public
have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to attend criminal trials,' " quoting from the
primary opinion, id., at 391. The resulting confusion among
commentators 1 and journalists 2 was not surprising.
Sec, e. g., Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: U:ght~ in Continuing
Conflict, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. ~m, 6:3 (1979) ("intended reach of the
majority opinion is unclear" (footnote omitted)); The Supreme Court,
1978 Term, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 65 (1979) ("widespread uncertainty
over what the Court held"); Note, 51 Colo. L. Rev. 425, 4:32-433 (1980)
(''Gannett can be intt•rprC'ted to ,;anction the clo~ing of triab"; citing
"1 he uncertainty of the languagt• in Gaunett," and it~ "ambiguous sixth
amendment holding"); Note, 11 Tex. Tech. L. Hev. 159, 170-171 (1979)
("perhaps much of the pre~rnt and imminent confm;ion lies in the Court's
own statement of its holding"); Borow and Kruth, Closed Preliminary
Hearings, 55 Calif. State Bar J. 18, 23 (1980) ("Despite the public disclaimers . . . , the majority holding appears to embmce the right of
access to trial. as well as pretrial hearings"); Goodale, Gannett Means
What it Says ; But Who Knows What it Says?, Nat'! Law J., Oct. 15,
1979, at 20; see also Keefe, The Boner Called Gannett, 66 A. B. A. J.
227 (1980) .
2 The press-perhaps the segment of society most profoundly affected
by Gannett-has called the Court's drcision "cloudy," Birmingham PostHerald, Aug. 21, 1979, at A4; ··confused," Chicago Sun-Time.;, Sept. 20,
1979, at 56 (cartoon) ; ''incoherent," B1-1ltimore Sun, Sept. 22 , 1979, at A14;
"mushy," Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1979, at Al5; and a "muddle,''
Time, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82, and New:sweek, Aug. 27, 197!), at 69.
1
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II
The Court's ultimate ruling in Gannett, with such clarification as is provided by the opinions in this case today,
apparently is now to the effect that there is no Sixth Amendment right on the part of the public-or the press-to an
open hearing on a motion to suppress. I, of course, continue
to believe that Gannett was in error, both in its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment generally, and in its application to the suppression hearing. for I remain convinced that
the right to a public trial is to be found where the Constitution explicitly placed it-in the Sixth Amendment. 3
The Court, however, has eschewed the Sixth Amendment
route. The plurality turns to other possible constitutional
sources and invokes a veritable potpourri of them-the speech
clause of the First Amendment, the press clause, the assembly clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a cluster of penumbral
guarantees recognized in past decisions. This course is troublesome, but it is the route that has been selected and, at
least for now, we must live with it. No purpose would be
served by my spelling out at length here the reasons for my
saying that the course is troublesome. I need do no more
than observe that uncertainty marks the nature-and stric ness-of the standard of closure the Court adopts. The
plurality opinion speaks of"all overriding interest articulated
in findings," ante, at 24; MR. JusTICE STEWART reserves, perhaps not inappropriately, "reasonable limitations," ante, at 2;
MR. JusTICE BHENNAN presents his separate analytical framework; MR. JusTICE PowELL in Gannett was critical of those
Justices who, relying on the Sixth Amendment, concluded
a I shall not again seek to drmonstrale the errors of analyHis in the
Court's opinion in Gan·nett. I notr, however, that the very existence of
the pre.·rnt <'a:-se illust m fp,; the u! !Pr fallacy of thinking, in this context,
that "the pnblic intere;;t. is fully protected by the participant;; in the
litigation." Ganuett Co . Y. DePa~quale, 443 U . S. :368, 3S4 (1979). Cf..
·id., at 438-439 (opinion in partial clis;;ent).
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that closure is authorized only when "strictly and inescapably
necessary," 443 U. S., at 339-400; and MR. JusTICE REHNQU IST continues his fiat rejection of, among others, the First
Amendment avenue.
Having said all this, and with the Sixth Amendment set
to one side in this case, I am driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must provide some
measure of protection for public access to the trial. The
opinion in partial dissent in Gannett explained that the public has an intense need and a deserved right to know about
the administration of justice in general; about the prosecution of local crimes in particular; about the conduct of the
judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, police officers, other
public servants, and all the actors in the judicial arena; and
about the trial itself. See 443 U. S., at 413, and n. 2, 414,
428- 429, 448. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U. S. 469 , 492 (1975). It is clear and obvious to me,
on the approach the Court has chosen to take, that, by closing this criminal trial, the trial judge abridged these First
Amendment interests of the public.
I also would reverse, and I join the jud~ment of the Court.,
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta Iolanthe, the Lord Chancellor recites:
"The Law is the true embodiment
of everything that's excellent,
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my lords, embody the law."

It is difficult not to derive more than a little of this flavor
from the various opinions supporting the judgment in this
case. The opinion of THI<: CHIEF JusTICE states that:
"[H] ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide
whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public
upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any
demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other
overriding considera.tion requires closure." Ante, at 7.
/ The opinion of MR. JusTICJ<J BRENNAN states that;
"[R]ead with care and in context, our decisions must
therefore be understood as holding only that any privilege
of access to governmental information is subject to a
degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality." Ante, at 2-3.
For the reasons stated in my separate concurrence in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 403 (1979), I do

/
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not believe that either the First or Sixth Amendments, as
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, require that
a State's reasons for denying public access to a trial, where
both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have consented to an order of closure approved by the judge, are subject to any additional constitutional review at our h~nds.
And I most certainly do not believe that the Ninth Amendment confers upon us any such power to review orders of
state trial judges closing trials in such situations. See ante,
at 22, n. 15.
'
We have at present 50 state judicial systems and one federal
judicial system in the United States, and our authority to
reverse a decision by the highest court of the State is limited
to only those occasions when the state decision violates some
provision of the United States Constitution. And that .authority should be exercised with a full sense that the judges
whose decisions we review are making the same effort as we
to uphold the Constitution. As said by Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurring in the result in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 540
"we are not final because we are infallible, but we are infalli~
ble only because we are final."
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound
to be a matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens.
But to gradrally rein in, as this Court has done over the past
generation, ,all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over
how justice ' shall be administered, not merely in the federal
system but in ea.ch of the 50 States, is a task that no Court
consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is equal to. Nor is
it desirable .that such authority be exercised by such a tiny
numerical fragment of the 220 million people who compose the
population of this country. In the same concurrence just
quoted, Mr. Justice Jackson a.ccurately observed that "[t]he
generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indeterminate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court
has found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to

...
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magnify federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the
states." Id., at 534.
However high minded the impulses which originally
spawned this trend may have been, and which impulses have
been accentua.ted since the time Justice Jackson wrote, it is
basically unhealthy to have so much authority concentrated
in a small group of lawyers who have been appointed to the
Supreme Court and enjoy virtual life tenure. Nothing in the
reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Mad:i8on,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) requiresthatthisCourtthrough
ever broadening use of the Supremacy Clause smother a
healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national
government embracing 50 States.
The issue here is not whether the "right" to freedom of the
press conferred by the First Amendment to the Constitution
overrides the defendant's "right" to a fair trial conferred by
other amendments to the Constitution; it is instead whether
any provision in the Constitution may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial judge in the Virginia state court system.
did in this case. Being unable to find any such prohibition
in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or any other Amendments to 1the;
United States Constitution, or in the Constitution itself1 I
cli~'nt,

